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 Abstract 
This dissertation delves into different aspects of a relatively new policy approach for 
industrial pollution control: the public dissemination of information by regulators regarding 
the environmental performance of firms. These schemes are sometimes referred to as 
regulation through disclosure or informational regulation. It is presumed that disclosure as an 
environmental regulation triggers and intensifies interactions between polluting firms and 
workers, community groups, consumers, and owners. It thus increases the costs of non-
compliance with environmental law through channels that do not directly involve the 
regulator.  
 
The understanding that information is important for market emergence together with evidence 
suggesting that disclosure schemes can influence firms’ environmental performance, have 
resulted in a certain enthusiasm for these approaches. There are however still voids in the 
theoretical foundations of disclosure as regulation, as well as in the empirical evidence 
supporting its alleged effectiveness (in particular in developing and emerging economies). 
This dissertation aims at contributing to the growing literature on disclosure in both these 
regards. The discussion consists of four self-contained chapters. Chapter 1 looks into some 
theoretical issues of environmental compliance under asymmetric information. Chapters 2 and 
3 constitute an empirical evaluation of a well-structured disclosure program, Indonesia’s 
PROPER, while Chapter 4 studies the more informal type of provision of information in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
Informal mechanisms such as public disgrace faced by managers and owners of polluting 
firms and moral suasion have been suggested as possible explanatory factors of firm 
environmental behavior. The first contribution of this dissertation is in this area. Building on 
earlier work, Chapter 1 develops a model of social interactions where managers and owners 
of highly polluting firms face stigmatization and losses in reputation in society. I argue that 
symmetric information is a silent assumption of earlier papers on social interactions that is not 
necessarily met in the industrial pollution case. I study situations where firms’ environmental 
performance is perfectly observable and imperfectly observable. The findings show that 
relaxing the perfect observability assumption, even by a small a margin, could have profound 
effects on the reputation functions in such a way that high levels of compliance cannot be 
sustained in equilibrium.  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 evaluate the effectiveness of Indonesia’s public disclosure program 
PROPER. The main result is that the policy was responsible for a rapid and significant 
reduction in emissions intensity as measured by biochemical oxygen demand, BOD, and 
chemical oxygen demand, COD (the characteristics of those firms that were most responsive 
to the program are also unveiled). Chapter 4 is also an empirical study of more informal type 
of provision of information in Central and Eastern Europe during the first years of transition. 
The analysis reveals that enforcement and public disclosure of the environmental performance 
of firms are the most important forces behind the implementation of Environmental 
Management Practices. The findings of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 strengthen the belief that thin 
markets and other sluggish mechanisms are the results of imperfect information and also 
indicate that informational regulation is a promising strategy to tackle industrial pollution in 
the presence of weak institutions.   
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 Introduction 
Portney (2000) states that three significant trends are likely to endure in the environmental 
policy arena in the period 2000 – 2050. Governments are expected to continue shaping their 
institutional arrangement to deal with environmental problems in more effective ways. This is 
related to the increased use of market-oriented approaches such as emission fees and tradable 
emission permits. Economics has been the major advocate of such policies due to the alleged 
efficiency properties to achieve overall levels of environmental quality. The second trend 
refers to the increased decentralization of environmental institutions. Given that many of the 
environmental problems occur at the local level, it is believed that they ought to be solved at 
that same level. The primary topic of this dissertation concerns the third trend: the public 
dissemination of information by regulators regarding the environmental performance of firms 
in terms of for example emissions to air and water. The first two major public disclosure 
programs in the developed and the developing worlds are the US Toxics Release Inventory  
TRI (1988 – today) and Indonesia’s Program for Pollution Control Evaluation and Rating – 
PROPER (1995 – 1998 and 2002 – today). Such schemes are sometimes referred to as 
regulation through disclosure or informational regulation. The relative ease with which 
information can be disseminated with today’s technologies and the generally accepted idea of 
citizens right-to-know about environmental hazards have helped pave the way for their use.  
For over three decades the economics of information has highlighted that interactions among 
economic agents are largely mediated by the existing information structure. It is now 
acknowledged by economists that information is often imperfect, and that this leads to market 
failure. Akerlof’s (1970) often cited paper on “lemons” was the seminal contribution in the 
field. It is thus presumed that disclosure as an environmental regulation triggers and 
intensifies interactions between polluting firms and workers, community groups, consumers, 
and owners, increasing the costs of non-compliance with environmental law through channels 
that do not directly involve the regulator (Tietenberg, 1998).  
The understanding that information is important for market emergence together with evidence 
suggesting that disclosure schemes can influence firms’ environmental performance, have 
resulted in a certain enthusiasm for these approaches. There are however still voids in the 
theoretical foundations of disclosure as regulation, as well as in the empirical evidence 
supporting its alleged effectiveness. This dissertation aims at contributing to the growing 
literature on disclosure in both these regards. The discussion consists of four self-contained 
chapters. Chapter 1 looks into some theoretical issues of environmental compliance under 
perfect and imperfect information structures. Chapters 2 and 3 constitute an empirical 
evaluation of a well-structured disclosure program, Indonesia’s PROPER, while Chapter 4 
studies the more informal type of provision of information in Central and Eastern Europe, as 
well as other aspects of firm environmental behavior in transition economies.  
 
Although the advances in information economics have been remarkable, there are still several 
unexplored areas (Stiglitz, 2000). For instance, the bulk of the research in the field has 
focused on market interactions (Stiglitz, 2002). However, social interactions, such as those 
encompassed by the human tendency to conform to social codes of behavior, have been 
recognized to be a determining factor of economic performance; see Akerlof (1980)1. 
Regarding the industrial pollution problem, informal mechanisms such as public disgrace 
faced by managers and owners of polluting firms and moral suasion have been suggested as 
possible explanatory factors of firm behavior. The first contribution of this dissertation is in 
this area.  Building on earlier work, Chapter 1 develops a model of social sanctions where 
mangers and owners of highly polluting firms face stigmatization and losses in reputation in 
society. I study situations where the environmental performance of firms is perfectly 
observable and, unlike earlier papers, imperfectly observable. I argue that perfect information 
is a tacit assumption of earlier work that is not necessarily met in the industrial pollution case. 
In fact, the individual compliance status of firms is unlikely to be perfectly observable in the 
social circles where owners and managers interact. I characterize (expected) loss in reputation 
functions for owners and managers. The results suggest that relaxing the perfect observability 
assumption has profound negative effects on the possible equilibrium outcome. Although this 
is not necessarily surprising, what is particularly striking is that the reputation functions and 
the incentives to comply in both the perfect and imperfect information worlds are 
“diametrically” different. For instance, social sanction approaches state that high levels of 
obedience to a costly norm (that is, a large proportion of the population following a norm that 
entails a cost to those who conform) can be supported in equilibrium. In fact, in a law-abiding 
high compliance world it is clear that the loss in reputation from being caught cheating could 
                                                 
1 This is one of first papers to formally study social codes of behavior in the economics literature. In the model 
set up in this paper, managers and owners of firms face stigmatization in society when they do not pay what is 
considered a “fair” wage. The persistence of a “fair” wage higher that is higher that the market-clearing wage 
could thus explain the existence of unemployment in a “perfect” competitive market.  
be devastating and we can imagine that this is a strong force explaining why high levels of 
compliance might be present. In contrast, the model of Chapter 1 shows that imperfect 
information causes the expected social sanction to be at its lowest precisely when obedience is 
more common. The essential aspect of the analysis lies in the way society forms expectations 
about the compliance status of firms. It is first presumed that although the compliance status 
of individual firms is not perfectly observable to society, the level of violation in the economy 
is and that this piece of information provides a natural estimate of the likelihood that any 
given firm is in violation.  I then argue that society will find it hard to believe that any given 
firm is in non-compliance precisely when disobedience is rare. In fact, people find it difficult 
to conceive that someone is of a given type or has a certain characteristic when they know that 
very few in society are of that type or have that characteristic. Thus, high levels of obedience 
cannot be supported in equilibrium. Our findings highlight the difference between social and 
moral norms. Although the “punishment” borne by a disobedient individual in both settings 
may depend on the behavior of his or her peers in similar fashions, we show that in the latter 
case the individual decision and aggregate outcome depends dramatically on observability.  
Disclosure as an environmental regulation is still in its infancy. The current evidence of its 
success at delivering emissions reductions and the different mechanisms through which it 
works is to some extent fragmentary and anecdotal. For instance, while the US TRI program, 
which was the first informational regulation scheme in the world, is claimed to have led to a 
45% emissions reduction, there is no analysis that has actually been able to attribute these 
reductions to the policy itself (Hahn et al., 2003). However there exists partial evidence on the 
effectiveness of the TRI and on the success of a smaller scale Canadian program. A related 
issue arises here, regarding the possible performance of disclosure in less developed countries 
with weak governmental institutions and imperfect markets. Will attempts to restore perfect 
information trigger the necessary forces to induce environmental friendly behavior in these 
societies? We know, for instance, that perfect information is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for markets to emerge. In fact if society’s latent demand for environmental 
amenities is low, such amenities will not even be provided under perfect information. 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 address this question and other related issues through two case studies 
from developing and transition economies.  
Chapters 2 and 3 evaluate Indonesia’s PROPER disclosure program which was launched in 
June 1995. Faced with the discrepancy between a powerful and expanding industrial sector 
and its own lack of resources, Indonesia’s environmental authority decided to tackle industrial 
emissions control through an information disclosure program.2 As mentioned earlier, 
PROPER was the first and most visible informational regulation scheme in the developing 
world. Chapter 2, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, presents the first formal analysis 
addressing the effectiveness of information strategies in reducing pollution in a developing 
country. We analyze changes in emissions concentrations (mg/L) using panel data techniques 
with plant-level data for participating firms and a control group. The main result is that the 
policy was responsible for a rapid and significant reduction in emissions intensity as 
measured by biochemical oxygen demand, BOD, and chemical oxygen demand, COD. This 
finding strengthens the belief that thin markets and other sluggish mechanisms are the results 
of imperfect information and also indicate that informational regulation is a promising 
strategy to tackle industrial pollution in the presence of weak institutions.  
Chapter 3 goes a step further in the analysis of PROPER. Here I analyze plant level data to 
relate environmental responses to facility characteristics. The broad objective of this chapter 
is to contribute to the understanding of the mechanisms through which provision of 
information programs work. The data set used in this chapter is one of the most 
comprehensive data sets available in the developing world (in that it includes both firm 
characteristics and environmental performance under a regulatory regime based on disclosure) 
although it is still somewhat limited in scope. A number of interesting findings are 
nevertheless identified: Firstly, foreign-owned firms were consistently most responsive to the 
program, which can be interpreted as managers of polluting firms facing higher pressure from 
foreign investors. It has also been shown that the technological levels of foreign-owned in 
Indonesia are higher as compared to local firms, and they could be better endowed to face 
new environmental challenges. Being located in Java, Indonesia’s main island, seemed to be 
important in determining the extent to the response. Java is the most densely populated island 
on Earth, has higher incomes, better media coverage, access to political arena, and a greater 
potential for community pressure. Also, Chapters 2 and 3 find that, after controlling for a 
number of factors, those firms that were rated as heavy polluters were more likely to produce 
emissions reductions than the relatively greener firms. This result can initially be interpreted 
in terms of greener firms having more technological difficulties in achieving further emissions 
                                                 
2 Whereas the origins of the disclosure approach of the US TRI program lie in the grassroots belief that citizens 
have the right to know about environmental hazards they are exposed to (Sunstein, 1999), the origins of 
Indonesia’s PROPER fall into the regulatory functions of the state. This does not imply that citizen’ right to 
know is not always a precondition for the implementation of disclosure strategies.  
reductions due to increasing marginal costs of abatement. Note also that the incentives to 
abate emissions provided by a bad environmental performance are much stronger than those 
provided by a good one. 
In Chapter 4, we use firm-level data to study the adoption of Environmental Management 
Practices (EMPs) in the most polluting industrial sectors in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, and Slovakia during the period of 1990 – 1998 when these countries were 
in transition away from central planning. Data on economies in transition offer us the 
opportunity to look at some fundamental factors of firm behavior. During the transition, some 
dramatic changes occurred such as the creation of secure property, functioning markets and 
inflows of foreign direct investment. Also, the official inspection, monitoring and regulatory 
authorities such as the Ministries of Environment, the environmental protection agencies and 
the inspectorates were strengthened during this period. Regarding civil rights, before 1990 
there was generally little information available on pollution but today such information is 
often public since most of these countries enforce the public's right to know on the 
environment. The analysis reveals that enforcement and public disclosure of the 
environmental performance of firms are the most important forces behind the implementation 
of EMPs. Disclosure refers to the appearance of firms in media reports about emissions of 
major pollutants. It is interesting to see that such a mechanism also works in transition 
economies. In fact, the existence of civil liberties such as the right to information was one of 
the most crucial differences between “East” and “West.”  
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Abstract
The social sanction approach states that high levels of obedience to a costly
norm (a large proportion of the population following a norm that entails a
cost to those who conform) can be supported in equilibrium. The reason is
that the social disapproval and stigmatization faced by the disobedient are at
their highest when disobedience is the exception rather than the rule in soci-
ety. In contrast, it is found in this paper that imperfect observability causes
the expected social sanction to be at its lowest precisely when obedience is
more common. The essential aspect of the analysis lies in the way beliefs
are formed. Unless actions are fully observable, it is hard to conceive that
someone is in disobedience when disobedience is rare. In this line of argumen-
tation, the failure of an environmental norm as an internalization mechanism
can be explained.
Key words: Social Norm, Imperfect Information, Bayesian Equilibrium
JEL Classification: D29, D83, Q53
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1 Introduction
This paper attempts to increase our understanding of the effects of reputation on
compliance with certain norms of behavior, and particularly the role of information
in mediating this relationship. It has been argued that social sanctions imposed on
managers and owners of polluting firms can provide an internalization mechanism
of external costs and damages. Cropper and Oates (1992), in their survey of en-
vironmental economics, suggest that public opprobrium may explain the observed
coexistence in the United States of high levels of firm compliance with environmen-
tal regulation and low expected penalties. This is known as the Harrington Paradox
(HP) (Harrington, 1988). More recently, Elhauge (2005) argues extensively about
the relevance that social sanctions have on influencing manager decisions to under-
take environmental investments. Decision makers would decide to incur costs of
compliance rather than face stigmatization and reputation losses in society.
Nyborg and Telle (2004) and Lay et al. (2003) formalize the notion of social
sanction in the case where firms are expected to meet an environmental standard.
The idea that social sanctions are relatively high when disobedience is uncommon
in the economy allows a high compliance state to qualify as an equilibrium (Akerlof,
1980). However, the social sanction approach does not necessarily give a unique
prediction of equilibrium. Low compliance equilibria could coexist since losses in
reputation are low at high levels of disobedience.
An underlying assumption that seems ubiquitous in this literature is that of
perfect observability of agent behavior, for example in terms of emissions and com-
pliance status. We argue that, unlike other situations in which social sanctions have
been used to explain economic behavior, this assumption is not necessarily met in
the industrial pollution case. In fact, social sanctions are generated in different en-
vironments, and individual actions and compliance status of firms are unlikely to
be perfectly observable in the social circles where owners and managers interact. In
some cases, awareness of the identity of polluting sources may be limited to neigh-
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boring communities, and even for these it may be very difficult to judge whether a
given emitter is in or out of compliance with the legislation.
The purpose of this paper is to study the consequences of relaxing the perfect ob-
servability assumption. In our model, society forms beliefs (or expectations) about
the compliance status of individual firms based on two pieces of information: the
general level of violation in the economy, and signals that can convey some indication
of the firm’s compliance status. Managers’ expected losses in reputation are in turn
built on society’s beliefs. We show how small deviations from perfect observability
rule out the high compliance states as possible equilibria. The lynchpin of our ar-
gument is that the likelihood of being unveiled is a very different function from the
loss in reputation function. As already mentioned, the potential loss in reputation is
high when compliance is high, which is supposed to be a strong deterrent. However,
in a society where most people conform, it is hard to conceive or believe that any-
one would be in disobedience, in particular, when actions are not fully observable.
Expected losses in reputation due to a violating behavior are accordingly low, actu-
ally at their lowest, so that the highest compliance states can not be supported in
equilibrium. Thus, a social sanction explanation of the Harrington Paradox heavily
relies on observability of firm actions.1 Note that due to the way beliefs are formed
in our model, the compliance incentives in the perfect and imperfect information
worlds are diametrically opposed at high levels of compliance. We sometimes refer
to this as a “belief curse.”
The framework proposed in this paper provides insights into different situations
where similar social interactions and information asymmetries come into play. The
concluding section of the paper briefly discusses a corruption example in light of our
model.
1Haab and McConell (2002) discuss the relevance of observability of agents behavior in the
imposition of social sanctions in the context of disposal of debris from recreational boats in a marine
environment. In contrast to our example, they consider that the social sanction is only generated
in-situ at the emission point and is equal to zero if individuals are not observed committing
violations.
3
2 A model of reputation and compliance
The social norm in our model demands firms to meet a legal pollution standard.
Compliance is costly, but non-compliance could lead to a loss in reputation which
may also be costly. For simplicity we assume that regulatory costs due to non-
compliance are negligible or nonexistent. As stated earlier, the main feature of
social sanctions is that agent pay-off functions not only depend on own actions but
also on actions of other agents. In a setting where the number of agents who follow
a norm is relatively large, social disapproval due to deviation is high. Correspond-
ingly, if very few agents follow the norm, then the costs of deviation are small. Let
α ∈ [0, 1] represent the fraction of firms that violate the standard. The loss in rep-
utation function is R(α), where Rα < 0. By breaking the norm, violators derive
pecuniary benefits represented by saved abatement expenditures c.
We will only be concerned with situations where firms adopt pure strategies,
meaning they either comply or violate. Let d ∈ {0, 1} be a firm’s strategy, where 0
denotes compliance and 1 violation. A manager’s utility function is then given by:
U(d;α) =


−c if d = 0
−R(α) if d = 1
. (1)
In order to make our point clear we use the simplest linear reputation function,
R(α) = 1 − α. Furthermore, we assume that there is a unit mass of firms with
homogeneous fixed costs of compliance c ∈ (0, 1) and that a single firm’s actions do
not affect the value of R(α). This description fits that of perfect competition (or
non-atomic games).
A silent feature of the manager utility function in equation (1) is that of perfect
observability of firm behavior. The social sanction faced by managers is to a large
extent given by society’s beliefs concerning their firm type. Hereafter we will often
4
refer to a firm’s type as its compliance status. Under perfect information, society’s
assessment of a given firm being either type matches the actual firm type. Table
1 illustrates this. For instance, the bottom left corner of the table shows that the
probability of a violator being identified as a compliant is 0. This in turn implies
that the probability that this firm is identified as a violator is 1 (upper left corner).
If society was not capable of distinguishing between the two types, there would be
the possibility that compliant firms were wrongly perceived as violators (and the
other way around), which would lead to losses in reputation for the managers of
these firms.
Table 1: Society’s beliefs: Perfect Information.
Beliefs on firm being:
True firm type Compliant Violator
Compliant 1 0
Violator 0 1
In the analysis of the strategic interactions, the Nash Equilibrium and Strict
Nash Equilibrium concepts will be used. In our game each firm plays against the
aggregate of all other firms and a given level of violation, α, defines a strategy profile
of the game.
Definition 1. Let d∗(α) be a firm’s best response strategy to level of violation α, so
that U(d∗(α);α) ≥ U(d;α) for d ∈ {0, 1}. A strategy profile is a Nash Equilibrium
if all firms’ strategies are best response strategies. Further, a Nash Equilibrium is
Strict if each firm has a unique best response strategy. That is d∗(α) is such that
U(d∗(α);α) > U(d;α) for d ∈ {0, 1} for all firms.
Recall that a Nash Equilibrium requires that the outcome of a deviation be
no better for the deviant than the equilibrium outcome, whereas in a Strict Nash
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Equilibrium a deviation leads to an outcome that is worse for the deviant than the
equilibrium outcome.2 We now have all the elements to state the base case propo-
sition.
Proposition 1. Under perfect information concerning the compliance status of
firms, two strict Nash equilibria coexist: equilibrium (d∗ = 0 for all firms) and
the violation equilibrium (d∗ = 1 for all firms). A third nonstrict equilibrium with
partial compliance is also present.
Figure 1 illustrates the insight provided by this proposition by showing the
(dis)utilities of compliance and violation for different levels of violation (see ap-
pendix B for proof). Proposition 1 presents two strict equilibria, namely states K
and M in the figure, where all firms behave identically (or pooling equilibria). The
social sanction at high levels of compliance is high enough to keep this society in full
compliance, state K. Nevertheless, the compliance incentives are undermined at low
levels of compliance in such a way that a violation equilibrium could persist, state
M.3
It is important to note that the non-strict equilibrium in this full information
case, state L, comes across as arbitrary. It demands that exactly a fraction α′ of
firms choose violation and that the remaining 1 − α′ fraction of firms choose com-
2For a discussion on the properties of the strictness concept, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1998),
pg 11.
3The notion that reputation costs can be used to solve the Harrington Paradox is tempting at
first sight but a little reflection will point to the fact that this is not straightforward: In a law-
abiding high compliance world it is clear that the loss in reputation from being caught cheating
could be devastating and we can imagine that this is a strong force to comply. But what happens
in the context of lawlessness? If virtually everyone cheats then surely there will not be much loss
in reputation if I also cheat?. This weakens the power of the hypothesis - because we have to
assume high compliance in order to invoke the “loss in reputation” hypothesis that was supposed
to explain why high compliance is common. In this context, the loss in reputation hypothesis only
provides a partial explanation of the Harrington Paradox.
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pliance, although all firms in both groups are indifferent between their “chosen”
strategy and their “alternative” strategy. Still, in our model all firms (managers)
are identical and face the same external pressure, so there is no strong reason to
expect them to behave in different ways.
Figure 1: Perfect information equilibria.
The two straight lines represent the manager’s costs of compliance and violation.
The losses in reputation due to violation, R(α), are decreasing in the level of vi-
olation, α, whereas the cost of compliance are constant and equal to c. The full
compliance and the full violation states, K and M , are both Strict NE whereas the
state L, with partial compliance, is a Non-Strict NE.
We now turn to the imperfect information case. We assume that society has
fragmentary information based on which it forms expectations about the compli-
ance status of firms. Since beliefs are now formed with partial information, losses
in reputation could be imputed to both compliant firms and violators. We assume
that society knows the actual level of violation in the economy, α. This in fact
constitutes society’s (prior) belief on the violation type. If no other information is
available, α is society’s most sensible estimate of the chances that any given firm,
either compliant or violator, is in violation.4 Further, although society does not
4Environmental degradation may be an indicator of the level of violation in the economy. As-
sume that compliant firms emit 0 and violating firms emit z units of pollution. Since the number
of firms is normalized to unity, if they were all noncompliant then total pollution would be “z”.
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observe the compliance status of firms, it does receive a signal from each firm that
conveys information about its type. A signal could be denoted as either a violation
signal or a compliance signal. Note that since signals are mutually exclusive, the
occurrence of a compliance signal is equivalent to the non-occurrence of a violation
signal. Let pi and θ be the respective probabilities that society receives a violation
signal from a violator and a compliant firm. Consequently, 1− pi and 1− θ are the
probabilities that a compliance signal is received from a violator and a compliant
firm respectively. Note that these primitive probabilities are exogenous and that
firms cannot influence them. The imperfect information case is characterized by the
relation 0 < θ ≤ pi < 1. That is, society can not be less (more) likely to receive a
violation (compliance) signal from a violator than from a compliant firm.5 Table 2
presents a cross tabulation of signals and firm types.
Table 2: Probabilities of signals.
Firm Type
Signal Compliant Violator
Compliance 1− θ 1-pi
Violation θ pi
Once signals are realized, then society’s beliefs on the expected types of firms
are calculated using Bayes’ rule. Specifically, society’s beliefs about an individual
firm being the violation type when a violation signal is received take the following
form:
A(α, pi, θ) =
pi
piα+ θ(1− α)
α. (2)
If total pollution can be observed and is measured as W , then the statistic used by society to
calculate the share of polluting firms is given by α˜ = W
z
.
5Society’s knowledge about polluters in this model resembles that of the regulator in a non-point
source pollution problem.
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Society’s prior belief on the violation type, α, is updated via the ratio factor
given by the first part of the expression. When signals are uninformative, that is
pi = θ, then the updating factor equals 1 for all values of α ∈ [0, 1]. With informative
signals, that is pi > θ, this factor is higher than 1 for α ∈ [0, 1) and equal to 1 for
α = 1. Note that the denominator of the equation gives the total probability that
society receives a violation signal from any given firm. piα is the probability that
a violation signal comes from a violator, whereas θ(1− α) is the probability that a
violation signal comes from a non-violator (wrongly accused compliant firms). Thus,
equation (2) provides society with an estimate of the probability that a received
violation signal comes from a violator after correcting for the fact that violation
signals could also come from non-violators. Appendix A provides an idea of the order
of magnitude of the changes in beliefs induced by Bayesian updating in our model.
Society’s beliefs about a a given firm being the violation type when a compliance
signal is received take the following form:
B(α, pi, θ) =
(1− pi)
(1− pi)α+ (1− θ)(1− α)
α. (3)
In this case the updating factor with informative signals is lower than 1 for
α ∈ [0, 1) and equal to 1 for α = 1. Now the denominator of the equation gives
the total probability that society perceives a compliance signal from any given firm.
(1 − pi)α is the probability that a compliance signal comes from a violator and
(1 − θ)(1 − α) is the probability that a compliance signal comes from a compliant
firm. Thus, equation (3) gives the probability that a received compliance signal
comes from a violator after correcting for the fact that such signals are typically
expected to come from a compliant firm. Table 3 presents a tabulation of society’s
beliefs under imperfect information. Unlike the perfect information case (see Table
1), compliant firms risk being confused as violators, while violators could benefit
from passing as complaints.
From the previous discussion it follows that A(α, pi, θ) > α > B(α, pi, θ) for
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Table 3: Society’s beliefs: Imperfect Information.
Beliefs on firm being:
Signal Compliant Violator
Compliance B(α, pi, θ) 1−B(α, pi, θ)
Violation A(α, pi, θ) 1− A(α, pi, θ)
α ∈ (0, 1) when signals are informative. The probability that a firm is in violation is
higher when it emits a violation signal than when it emits a compliance signal. When
there is either total violation, α = 1, or total compliance, α = 0, then signals become
irrelevant and society is fully certain about all firm types: A(0, pi, θ) = B(0, pi, θ) = 0
and A(1, pi, θ) = A(1, pi, θ) = 1. When signals are uninformative, then firms are
completely anonymous and the level of violation, α, is the most sensible estimate
of the chances that any given firm is in violation: A(α, pi, θ) = B(α, pi, θ) = α.
Firms make their compliance decisions taking into account their own expectations
of being identified as violators. Unlike society, managers know their own types since
they make the decision on which type to adopt. Firms’ unconditional expectations
of being identified as violators when in violation and compliance are given by the
following expressions:
f v(α, pi, θ) = piA(α, pi, θ) + (1− pi)B(α, pi, θ). (4)
f c(α, pi, θ) = θA(α, pi, θ) + (1− θ)B(α, pi, θ). (5)
Figure 2 shows the form these beliefs take under imperfect information. The solid
curves represent firms’ unconditional beliefs, whereas the dashed curves represent
society’s beliefs. With uninformative signals, panel a), we have that f c(α, pi, θ) =
f v(α, pi, θ) = α. With informative signals, panel b), we have that f v(α, pi, θ) >
α > f c(α, pi, θ) for α ∈ (0, 1). That is, signals allow compliant types to decrease
their chances of being identified as violators, while violators see these chances in-
crease. As noted earlier, signals become irrelevant in the extreme cases f c(0, pi, θ) =
f v(0, pi, θ) = 0 and f c(1, pi, θ) = f v(1, pi, θ) = 1.
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Figure 2: Beliefs under imperfect and perfect information.
a) Uninformative signals b) Informative signals
c) Perfect information
The curves fv and f c are the manager’s expectations of being identified as a violator
when violation and compliance strategies are adopted (A and B are society’s beliefs
after signals have been received from the firm). When signals are uninformative, panel
a), the level of violation, α, define the manager’s beliefs of being identified as a violator
for both the violation and the compliance strategy. When signals are informative, panel
b), the chances of being identified as a violator typically diverge from α for both types
of managers. In the perfect information case, panel c), society’s beliefs always match
the actual behavior of firms in such a way that only violators are likely be identified as
such (see also Table 1).
Note that firms in violation can be unveiled with a probability f c < 1, but firms
in compliance may be wrongly perceived as or accused of violating with a proba-
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bility f c > 0. This is sometimes referred to as monitoring errors of type I and type II.
We started by looking at losses in reputation with perfect information and then
turned to probabilities of violation detection with imperfect information. We are
now in a position to synthesize and look at expected losses in reputation. These
are now given by f v(α, pi, θ)R(α) for the violation type and f c(α, pi, θ)R(α) for the
compliant type. Following the notation used in equation (1) managers’ expected
utility is:
UE(d;α, pi, θ) =


−f c(α, pi, θ)R(α)− c if d = 0
−f v(α, pi, θ)R(α) if d = 1
. (6)
Proposition 2. With imperfect information on the compliance status of firms we
have that:
• The full violation state (d∗ = 1 for all firms) is the only Strict Bayesian
equilibrium of the game.
• The full compliance state (d = 0 for all firms) does not qualify as an equilib-
rium.
• Two non-strict Bayesian equilibria emerge if the frequency of violation sig-
nals received from the compliant types, θ, is sufficiently low compared to the
frequency of the violation signals received from the violation types, pi.
The first two parts of Proposition 2 follow directly from the Bayesian belief for-
mation (see proof in appendix B). Since beliefs are completely accurate when there
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is full violation, the pay-offs in the perfect and imperfect information cases are ex-
actly the same. The full violation state is thus preserved as a Strict Equilibrium
under imperfect information. On the other hand, an important consequence of the
existence of imperfect information is the ruling out of full compliance as a possible
equilibrium. Note that the expected losses in reputation due to violation are zero
at full compliance under imperfect information. In a society where most people
conform, people find it hard to conceive that anyone would be in disobedience.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 illustrate the third part of Proposition 2: Emergence of partial
compliance.
Figure 3: Imperfect information equilibrium
with uninformative signals, pi = θ.
The two curves represent the manager’s expected costs of compliance and violation.
With uninformative signals the losses in reputation faced by the manager are equal
to αR(α) regardless of his or her decision to comply or not. Thus, the full violation
state, M , is the only (Strict) Bayesian Equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Imperfect information equilibrium
with informative signals, pi > θ.
Figure 5: Imperfect information equilibria
with very informative signals, pi >> θ.
The curves in Figures 4 and 5 represent the manager’s expected costs of compliance
and violation. The state M in both figures is a Strict Bayesian Equilibrium, while
the states K and L in Figure 5 are Non-Strict Baysian Equilibria. In Figure 4 the
only prediction of the game is full violation as signals do not allow compliant firms to
be distinguished from violators with accuracy. When signals are informative enough,
Figure 5, two partial compliance states emerge as possible equilibria.
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The expected cost of violation function is concave with respect to the level of
violation, α. It starts at zero, since the risk of being unveiled is zero when no one
violates. The function will rise as detection risk rises until a maximum when the
effect of a decreasing R(α) sets in. The expected costs of compliance function is
also concave and follows a similar pattern but naturally it does not fall below the
costs of compliance, c. When signals are uninformative (Figure 3) the losses in
reputation faced by the two types or firms are the same. Since obedient types also
incur in a compliance cost, disobedience is the only best strategy for the firm at all
levels of violation. As signals become informative (Figured 4 and 5) the expected
costs of violation typically increase, while the expected costs of compliance decrease.
Figure 5 shows that the equilibrium state K has moved, in relation to the per-
fect information case, to the interior of α ∈ [0, 1]. This state however does not meet
the strictness refinement, and is a less likely prediction of the game in this regard.6
Note also that although equilibrium L has been preserved in its original form of
non-strictness, it now occurs at higher levels of violation.
To sum up, our model has introduced three important elements in the analysis
of social sanctions:
1. Due to imperfect information, losses in reputation can “wrongly” be imputed
to compliant firms, while violators face lower expected costs of reputation as
they could pass as compliants.
2. When firm actions are observable losses in reputation due to non-compliance
are at their highest at high levels of compliance, providing a support for the
full compliance state to be an equilibrium. In contrast, imperfect information
makes this expected losses in reputation due to violation be at their lowest
levels precisely when compliance is relatively high.
6State K (but not state L) in Figure 5 would qualify as an equilibrium under more sophisticated
equilibrium concepts such as perfectness or evolutionary stability.
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3. Losses in reputation due to violation are increasing in the level of violation at
high levels of compliance, as opposed to decreasing as in the perfect informa-
tion case. A thicker veil of anonymity is drawn over violators as the proportion
of firms that meet the standard increases.
3 Conclusions and discussion
It has been stated that social sanctions imposed on managers and owners of pol-
luting firms, in the forms of losses in reputation, can provide an explanation of the
puzzling coexistence of high levels of firm compliance with environmental regulation
and low expected penalties in the United States (Harrington Paradox). This paper
has argued that such an explanation heavily relies on perfect information of firms
environmental behavior. We showed how the internalization mechanism of an en-
vironmental externality via social sanctions imposed on polluters is eroded due to
information asymmetries. When polluter actions are not fully observable, then full
compliance cannot be sustained in equilibrium as the expected social sanction, in
the form of losses in reputation, is at its lowest at such compliance levels. Using a
Bayesian belif formation model it is shown that people find it hard to believe that
someone is in disobedience when disobedience is rare. Note that a society where so-
cial pressure is somewhat unimportant could nevertheless exhibit higher obedience
than a society where social disapproval does play a more important role, if the latter
suffers more acute information asymmetries than the former.
To a certain extent, the “classical” environmental regulator can be viewed as
an agent that solves an information asymmetry between polluters and the judiciary
(Garvie and Keeler, 1994). In fact, its budget is spent in two different activities,
namely monitoring and enforcement, or the actual process of prosecuting firms. If
provision of information to the general public is relatively cheap, as seems to be
the case with today’s information technologies, then the regulator could publicly
disclose the environmental indicators of polluters and make use of social sanctions
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as a substitute for conventional enforcement.
Although the discussion has focused on an industrial pollution example, the ba-
sic framework lends itself to study other situations where similar social interactions
and information asymmetries are present. Direct examples may be found in the
exploitation of (other) common property resources and the contribution to a public
good.
The “belief curse” of our model could also help in understanding, for instance,
the relentless presence of corruption in some societies. As Bardhan (1997) puts it:
...the tenacity with which it [corruption] tends to persist in some cases
easily leads to despair and resignation on the part of those who are
concerned about it...
In this context, the social norm demands public officials not to engage in corrup-
tion whereas the costs of compliance with the norm are represented by the foregone
bribery benefits. Since corruption activities are carried out behind closed doors the
most likely equilibrium in light of our model is one in which most officials are corrupt
and society knows it but does not care, i.e. the social sanction is very low. Thus,
countries that currently exhibit low levels of corruption appear to be likely to move
to a violation state in the future, whereas more corrupt societies seem condemned
to the current state of affairs.
There are of course a number of other situations that do not fit the approach
undertaken here. There are circumstances where individuals may have internal mo-
tives to follow a certain norm. It may also be the case that, although an individual’s
incentives to follow the norm depend on the behavior of his or her peers, it does not
depend on observability. In some societies, it may suffice for an individual to know
that most peers are not corrupt to deter him or her from engaging in corruption.
This is, in fact, the case of moral norms and this paper illustrate how valuable such
norms can be.
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Appendix A
Table 4: A simulation of beliefs
Society’s Prior Society’s Posterior Firm Belief
α A B dif. fv f c dif.
(θ, pi) = (0.25, 0.50)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.25 0.40 0.18 0.22 0.29 0.24 0.05
0.50 0.67 0.40 0.27 0.53 0.47 0.06
0.75 0.86 0.67 0.19 0.76 0.71 0.05
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
(θ, pi) = (0.25, 0.75)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.25 0.50 0.10 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.20
0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.63 0.38 0.25
0.75 0.90 0.50 0.40 0.80 0.60 0.20
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
(θ, pi) = (0.50, 0.75)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.25 0.33 0.14 0.19 0.29 0.24 0.05
0.50 0.60 0.33 0.27 0.53 0.47 0.06
0.75 0.82 0.60 0.22 0.76 0.71 0.05
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
The first column gives society’s prior belief on a given firm being in violation, which
actually corresponds to the level of violation in the economy. The second and third
columns are society’s respective posterior beliefs of a firm being in violation after
a violation signal and a compliance signal have been received (Equations 2 and 3).
The fourth column show the difference between these posteriors. The fifth and sixth
columns give the firm’s expectation of being identified as a violator for both the
violation and the compliant types (Equations 4 and 5), while the last column shows
the difference between these expectations.
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Table 4 shows that society’s posterior beliefs diverge from the initial prior, α, for
α ∈ (0, 1). In the extreme cases, that is α = 0, 1, society’s beliefs, and thus the firm’s
expectations, match the firm behavior. For α = 0.5 in the upper and lower panel,
where the frequency of the violation signals for the violation types is 0.25 points
higher than the compliance types, the gap between the two society’s posteriors is
0.27. Note though, that the probabilities of being identified as a violator are higher
in the former case. In the middle panel, where the frequency of the violation signals
for the violation types is three times that of the compliant types, the gap is 0.50.
Both gaps and also the difference between them decrease as we move away from the
prior α = 0.5. Although firm’s beliefs follow a similar pattern, they do not diverge
as much from the initial prior α.
19
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof Proposition 1. The Proposition consists of three parts and each part will
be proved separately:
• d∗(0) = 0 for all firms is a Strict Nash Equilibrium (NE) since U(0; 0) >
U(1; 0), which holds given the assumption c < 1. QED
• d∗(1) = 1 for all firms is a Strict NE since U(1; 1) > U(0; 1), which holds
given the assumption c > 0. QED
• d∗(1 − c) = 1 for a fraction α = 1 − c of firms and d∗(1 − c) = 0 for the
remaining population of firms is a Non-Strict NE since U(1; 1−c) ≥ U(0; 1−c)
and U(0; 1 − c) ≥ U(1, 1 − c) hold simultaneously. Note that U(0; 1 − c) =
U(1; 1− c) = c. QED
Proof Proposition 2. Definition 1 can be extended to analyze the game under
imperfect information (Bayesian game) by studying expected pay-offs. We will use
UE(d;α) as a short form for UE(d;α;pi, θ). Thus, a firm’s best response strategy
is now defined by d∗(α) such that UE(d∗(α);α) ≥ UE(d;α) for d ∈ {0, 1}. This
Proposition also consists of three parts and each part will be proved separately:
• When α = 1, society’s beliefs are accurate and match the actual behavior of
firms: f v(1, pi, θ) = 1 and f c(1, pi, θ) = 0. This implies that UE(1; 1) = U(1; 1)
and UE(0; 1) = U(0; 1). Since U(1; 1) > U(0; 1), by the assumption c > 0, we
have that UE(1; 1) > UE(0; 1), which defines d∗(1) = 1 for all firms as a Strict
Bayesian Equilibrium. QED
• When α = 0, society’s beliefs also match the actual behavior of firms: f v(0, pi, θ) =
0 and f c(0, pi, θ) = 1. This implies that UE(0; 0) = U(0; 0) = −c and UE(1; 0) =
0. Since UE(1; 0) > UE(0; 0), d(0) = 0 is not a best response for any firm and
the full compliance state does not qualify as an equilibrium. QED
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• Presence of partial compliance equilibrium.
a) We start by characterizing the expected utility functions for the compliant
and violation types. UE(0;α) and UE(1;α) are both convex w.r.t α since:
UE
αα
(0;α) =
2θ2pi2
[piα + θ(1− α)]3
+
2(1− θ)2(1− pi)2
[(1− pi)α+ (1− θ)(1− α)]3
> 0
UE
αα
(1;α) =
2θpi3
[piα + θ(1− α)]3
+
2(1− θ)(1− pi)3
[(1− pi)α+ (1− θ)(1− α)]3
> 0
Appendix A illustrated that for α ∈ (0, 1) we have that f v
pi
(α, pi, θ) > 0, f v
θ
(α, pi, θ) <
0, f c
pi
(α, pi, θ) < 0 and f c
θ
(α, pi, θ) > 0. it directly follows that UE(0;α) is in-
creasing in pi and decreasing in θ for all α ∈ (0, 1), while UE(1;α) is decreasing
in pi and increasing in θ for all α ∈ (0, 1). In the extreme cases, α ∈ {0, 1},
signals become irrelevant so that pi and θ are not parameters of the expected
utility functions.
b) When signals are uninformative, that is pi = θ = k, α is society’s best predic-
tion of any firm being in violation. The losses in reputation for both compliant
an violators are thus given by αR(α) and the expected utility functions take
the following form (see Figure 3):
UE(1;α) = α2 − α
UE(0;α) = (α2 − α)− c
UE(1;α) > UE(0;α) for all α. It is important to note that the difference in
expected utilities between the compliance strategy and the violation strategy is
constant and given by c.
c) From step a), it follows that as signals become informative, that is pi = k+²1
and/or θ = k−²2, this difference in expected utilities is reduced for all α ∈ (0, 1)
however, it is maintained for α ∈ {0, 1} (see Figure 4). When signals are
even more informative we have that UE(1;α) < UE(0;α) for some values of
α ∈ (0, 1) (see Figure 5).
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d) The values of the parameters that make UE(0;α, pi, θ) and UE(1;α, pi, θ)
equal and tangent w.r.t. α define threshold points. Explicitly,
UE(1;α, pi, θ) = UE(0;α, pi, θ)
UE
α
(1;α, pi, θ) = UE
α
(0;α, pi, θ)
Let the pairs {α1(pi), θ1(pi)} and {α2(θ), pi2(θ)} be solutions to the system of
equations (1) and (2) for values of pi and θ respectively (although existence
has not formaly been proved, their presence is apparent in several simulations
for relevant values of pi and θ carried out by the author). If θ < θ1(pi → 1)
and/or pi > pi2(θ) the two expected utilities intersect in two points, that is
UE(0;α) = UE(1;α) for two values of α. Note that in these states, d∗(α) = 1
is a best response strategy for α proportion of firms, while d∗(α) = 0 is a
best response strategy for the remaining set of firms. There thus exist two
Non-Strict Bayesian Equlibria with partial compliance (see Figure 5). QED
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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the Program for Pollution Control Evaluation 
and Rating (PROPER) in Indonesia. PROPER, the first major public disclosure 
program in the developing world, was launched in June 1995; though it collapsed in 
1998 with the Asian financial crisis, it is currently being revived. There have been 
claims of success for this pioneering scheme, yet little formal and conclusive analysis 
has been undertaken. We analyze changes in emissions concentrations (mg/L) using 
panel data techniques with plant-level data for participating firms and a control group. 
The results show that there was indeed a positive response to PROPER, especially 
among firms with poor environmental compliance records. The response was 
immediate, and firms pursued further emissions reductions in the following months. 
The total estimated reductions in biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and chemical 
oxygen demand (COD) were approximately 32%. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past decade, public disclosure of pollution has appeared as a new instrument 
aimed at reducing industrial pollution. One of the first and most notable was the U.S. 
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program of 1988. The Program for Pollution Control 
Evaluation and Rating (PROPER) in Indonesia can claim to be the first large-scale 
program in the developing world.1 These schemes can be seen as either a complement 
or a substitute to traditional regulation, the enforcement of which is difficult and 
expensive but critical for policy success.2 Information disclosure can also be seen as 
an alternative to market-based instruments, such as taxes.  
The principle behind the public disclosure approach is the correction of an 
information asymmetry. Tietenberg (1998) refers to information disclosure as the 
third wave of instrument choice (after regulation and market-based instruments) and 
suggests that provision of information triggers and/or intensifies interactions among 
firms, workers, community groups, consumers, and financial markets as well as the 
regulators themselves. It thus increases the expected costs of non-compliance through 
channels that do not directly involve the regulator. Other non-monetary factors, such 
as managers’ desire to avoid disgrace, probably play an important role.  
A feature that has made disclosure schemes very attractive to policymakers is their 
low cost: a properly managed and relatively small infrastructure for collecting and 
disseminating information is generally sufficient for implementation. The widely 
accepted idea of citizens’ right to know has both paved the way for the use of these 
schemes and prompted the authorities to learn about the environmental preferences of 
                                                 
1 Other important examples include Canada’s National Release Inventory (1993–present), the United 
Kingdom’s Pollutant Inventory (1998–present), and Australia’s National Pollutant Inventory (1998–
present). In the developing world we find several modeled on PROPER, such as the Philippines’ Eco-
watch (1998–present) and the more ambitious Chinese Green-watch (1999–present). Although the 
programs vary widely in structure, they share the common principle of information disclosure.  
2 For a review of the theoretical and empirical economics literature on monitoring and enforcement of 
environmental policy, see Cohen (1999). 
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the public.3 Another important aspect is that information collection may be a first step 
toward the possible introduction of other policies at a later stage.  
The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of disclosure programs in reducing 
pollution—the ultimate goal from an environmental perspective—is still limited, 
however.4 Konar and Cohen (1997) analyze the U.S. TRI scheme and find in a set of 
130 firms that bad publicity was correlated with falling stock prices, which in turn 
were followed by emissions reductions. Furthermore, the greater the fall in stock 
price, the larger the observed emissions reduction. Because the TRI builds entirely on 
legal emissions, bad publicity is mainly associated with polluters’ relative position in 
the ranking. Note that the released reports are completely based on self-reported data, 
allowing for obvious bias. According to Hahn et al (2003), the TRI is claimed to have 
led to a 45% reduction although there is no analysis that has actually been able to 
attribute this reduction to the policy itself. Foulon et al. (2002) find that in a set of 15 
pulp and paper firms in British Columbia, appearance on the Ministry of 
Environment’s polluters list strengthened the conventional enforcement strategies 
(fines and penalties) and provided strong incentives for pollution control. The list only 
discloses the identity of noncompliant firms and firms of concern for the regulator.  
In the developing world, where enforcement is generally weak, the evidence on the 
effectiveness of information strategies is to a large extent anecdotal. Afsah et al. 
(1997a) and more recently Wang et al. (2002) have reported the success of 
information disclosure schemes in Indonesia and China, respectively. Their work is 
mainly descriptive and shows a tendency toward improving environmental indicators 
among the participating firms. Nonetheless, they do not have the necessary data to 
analyze in detail whether the programs accounted for the observed improvements. 
More specifically, would some emissions reductions have occurred in the absence of 
                                                 
3 Portney (2000) identifies disclosure as one of the enduring changes in environmental policy in the 
world for the period 2000 - 2050. 
4 Evidence from the empirical literature on stock market reactions to the programs suggests negative 
effects on stock prices for heavier polluters after information releases. Khanna et al. (1998) and 
Hamilton (1995) analyze the U.S. TRI Program. Lanoie et al. (1998) study the effects of the list of 
polluters published by the Ministry of Environment of British Columbia, Canada. Dasgupta et al. 
(2001) show that stock markets in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and the Philippines react to 
announcements of information on environmental events. 
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the program? If so, how large of a share of the reduction was the program responsible 
for? It is important to answer these questions now that information disclosure 
programs are starting to be widely used in poor countries, even though the existing 
evidence is still fragmentary. 
The PROPER program was launched in June 1995 and operated for three years as the 
first major scheme in the developing world to use information disclosure. At the time, 
it was considered an inspiring and reasonably cheap experiment and several other 
countries set off to emulate various aspects (see World Bank 2000).5 The PROPER 
scheme targeted major industrial water polluters and used a five-color scale to grade 
the environmental performance of different facilities. The grading is primarily built on 
polluters’ compliance status with existing regulation and, unlike the TRI ranking and 
the British Columbia polluters’ list, included both compliant (Gold, Green and Blue 
grades), and noncompliant firms (Red and Black grades).6 Four rounds of evaluations 
were released to the media over the three years that the program ran. In 1998, 
Indonesia and other countries of the region were hit by a severe recession coupled 
with other structural and political problems. This “Asian financial crisis” occasioned 
considerable political and administrative turmoil, and the PROPER program ceased to 
function. Currently, however, it is being revived—this time, on a larger scale, making 
it all the more urgent to analyze the first period and draw lessons for its redesign. We 
address the effect of the PROPER scheme on actual pollution by analyzing a panel 
data set of firms that participated in the program and a control group of firms that did 
not. The use of both ex ante and ex post information allows us to study possible 
changes in pollution trends due to the policy, and the inclusion of a control group of 
nonparticipating firms allows us to control for unobserved factors that could have 
                                                 
5  The average annual budget of the PROPER program during the period 1995 - 1998 was US$200.000, 
which translates into a cost of US$740 per firm per year. 65% of the budget was allocated to 
monitoring and inspection activities, 15% to laboratory tests and 20% to information processing and 
administration.   
6 Although there is a tendency in the literature to pool disclosure programs in a unique group, it is 
constructive to recognize the different incentives provided by different schemes. For instance, rankings 
may trigger more intense competition among firms with respect to pollution abatement than N-tier 
schemes. We do not yet know whether the performance of programs in terms of emission reductions 
and costs are influenced by such design details. 
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affected emissions in the economy as a whole. To the best of our knowledge, there are 
no other published studies that analyze, econometrically, emissions rates as a function 
of environmental policy in the developing world. Most studies in this field compare 
data before and after a program and ascribe observed changes to the program. 
However, the existence of trends in emissions implies that such evaluations may be 
biased, thus casting some doubts on the claimed potential of information disclosure to 
deliver pollution reductions in economies with weak governmental institutions and 
imperfect markets. 
The results of this study show that there was indeed a strong, positive response to the 
scheme, in particular among firms with poor environmental compliance records; these 
firms cut their emissions intensity by approximately a third. The response was 
immediate, and firms pursued further reductions in the following months. We do 
however not find definitive evidence of further abatement in the firms that were in 
compliance already at the start of the program.    
We also find that self-reported data tend to underestimate actual readings. Although 
our overall conclusions concerning the estimated effect of PROPER are not sensitive 
to the use of controls for self-reported data, our results do point to the need for 
strategies to induce truthful reporting, even among those firms that already have a 
reputation of being green. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes 
information disclosure as a policy instrument, and Section 3 presents an overview of 
some aspects of environmental management in Indonesia. Section 4 presents the 
estimation approach, Section 5 reports the data, and Section 6 discusses the results. 
Section 7 concludes.  
2. Public disclosure as a policy instrument 
It is curious that economics, the discipline that reminds us there is no such thing as a 
free lunch, should itself sometimes still assume that information is freely available. 
Parsimony of information costs is generally accepted as a comparative advantage of 
the market mechanism, yet we know that the market cannot function at all without 
information, and we know that the environmental area is very complex. That implies 
that information demands may be heavy.  
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Countries such as Indonesia face a tough challenge in choosing and designing policy 
instruments to deal with industrial pollution. Conventional regulation (such as 
requirements to use best available technology) is known to be grossly inefficient, 
since it provides no incentive for firms to innovate. Furthermore, the whole process of 
setting standards is easily manipulated by powerful industrial lobbies. Indonesia was 
historically known for a high degree of centralization of both political and economic 
power in the same closely knit circle, making it hard for understaffed environmental 
regulators to enforce meaningful and costly requirements. Under such conditions, 
environmental regulations can even be co-opted to keep new, cleaner entrants out and 
further solidify the dominance of old, heavily polluting industries. 
Other instruments, such as taxes, permits, liability, voluntary agreements, and 
information disclosure, have been suggested to overcome the difficulties associated 
with direct regulation; see Sterner (2003). However, none of these solve all the 
regulator’s problems. With the market-based instruments, the regulator faces many of 
the old problems associated with command-and-control regulation plus new problems 
specifically related to the complexity of the market instruments themselves (e.g., Bell 
and Russell 2003; Russell and Vaughan 2003). Information disclosure is of special 
interest because it is both a prerequisite for other instruments and an instrument in its 
own right.  
A good deal of knowledge is necessary for any form of environmental policy. 
Environmental protection agencies in developing countries, however, do not usually 
have the necessary information and cannot collect it easily—especially if it is 
intended to be used for regulation or taxation. A public disclosure program can 
provide a useful mechanism for data collection. The fact that the information is 
disseminated and used for grading makes data quality important and opens up for 
monitoring and control. The data gathered allows authorities to set priorities and 
eventually develop the design of policy instruments. It is in this sense a prerequisite 
for regulation, voluntary agreements, or eco-taxes. The information collection is also 
a signal that the authorities are becoming more serious, and that signal itself can have 
important effects. 
Somewhat less obvious is the fact that information disclosure can act as an instrument 
in its own right. We know that bargaining can be a powerful instrument, but naturally 
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it also requires information. Today, information can be easily compiled, processed, 
and transmitted, and the U.S. TRI has suggested that the mere public provision of 
pollution data can trigger strong and sometimes unexpected effects on factor and 
output markets in addition to more traditional political channels. Public disclosure 
about a plant’s handling of toxic materials can prompt employees to demand higher 
safety standards or compensatory wages, enable communities to negotiate pollution 
reductions with local plants, cause environmentally conscious consumers to switch to 
greener products, and change investors’ behavior. The reaction is not limited to agents 
with “green” preferences. Bankers react not necessarily because they fear pollution 
but because they fear that others fear it—that is, they fear the market reactions to 
decreasing sales, liability exposure, declining profitability, falling property values, 
and so forth. Foulon et al. (2002) look at the effects of appearance on the Ministry of 
Environment’s polluters list in British Columbia and suggest the existence of a certain 
degree of complementarity between disclosure and conventional enforcement. In fact, 
a regulator that allocates its budget between monitoring and enforcement may use 
provision of information to liberate resources to increase monitoring.7 Information 
disclosure can take several forms. Complex information can be interpreted and 
conveyed through labeling schemes, of which there are several types. Type 1 is 
certification—of products, firms, processes, or management procedures—by 
independent agencies. Type 2 is self-certification, without fixed criteria or 
independent outside review. Type 3 is the provision of raw data, without 
interpretation or judgment, sometimes in the form of life-cycle analysis.  
Certification of organic food is widespread and one of the oldest schemes, but the 
number of new schemes has been increasing rapidly (see Nadaï 1999). Type 1 green 
labeling of products has become popular in northern Europe; Germany’s Blue Angel, 
started in 1977, was the first national eco-labeling program. Another form of 
disclosure is environmental certification of firms by ISO 14000 or EMAS standards,8 
which are oriented toward management: it is the environmental management system 
that is certified, not the products or processes per se. At least in some markets, 
                                                 
7 For an illustration on how this allocation takes place, see Garvie and Keeler (1993).  
8 ISO 14000 is run by the International Organization for Standardization, and the Eco-Management and 
Audit Scheme (EMAS) is run by the European Commission.  
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certification adds value to the firm or product by boosting credibility. Certification 
can also be an internal management instrument. To deal with inertia against new 
directives, managers have to fight to get their policies implemented throughout an 
organization. In this respect, ISO 14000 is akin to quality control (ISO 9000). 
Type 3 labeling is fairly common in industry. Volvo, for instance, evaluates its 
performance according to several criteria and its own internal goals, and the results 
are published in environmental reports. The U.S. TRI has characteristics of Type 3 
programs, except that it is not voluntary. One criticism of these is that the public 
cannot interpret such information.9 The program analyzed here, PROPER, has traits of 
both Type 3 and Type 1: the information is interpreted through rating and refers to 
firms or plants rather than products, and the rating—which is not voluntary—is 
carried out by a ministry rather than by a nongovernmental organization. 
3. PROPER and Indonesian environmental management10 
Before the financial crisis began in 1997, the growth of Indonesia’s industrial 
production was impressive. In the 1980s and 1990s, growth rates frequently surpassed 
10% per annum, and Indonesia was one of the so-called miracle economies of Asia. 
Increased prosperity even appears to have benefited the poor. The proportion of 
people below the poverty line declined from 60% to around 11% from 1970 to 1996. 
Development was nevertheless uneven, both socially and geographically: 75% of the 
industrial activity in Indonesia was concentrated in Java. Estimates in 1994 indicated 
that industrial pollution accounted for 25% to 50% of the total pollution load in rivers 
of the island (World Bank 1994). Industrial contamination had become a serious 
health problem and (along with over-fishing) was threatening the coral reef diversity 
of the archipelago—the most densely populated area on earth.  
Despite increasing environmental problems, the environmental protection sector has 
traditionally been weak in Indonesia. The first serious attempt of the Ministry of 
Population and Environment to control industrial pollution was the semi-voluntary 
                                                 
9 Experience has shown that other organizations will use the information to develop ratings and 
evaluations for communities, NGOs, investors, and others. 
10 For a detailed description of the PROPER program and the Indonesian regulatory regime in the 
1980s and 1990s, see Afsah and Vincent (1997). 
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Clean River program, begun in 1989. The Clean River program was based on 
pollution reduction agreements between provincial vice-governors and polluting 
firms. The agreements were not legally binding, however, and their details were kept 
secret. In 1990, BAPEDAL, the new environmental authority, took over the 
program.11 Although it appeared to have some success in reducing pollution, stronger 
measures were needed. 12 
Faced with the discrepancy between a powerful and expanding industrial sector and 
its own lack of resources, BAPEDAL decided to tackle industrial emissions control 
through an information disclosure program. Earlier attempts at regulation had not 
been very successful, no fines were ever assessed and the authorities lost 90% of cases 
taken to court. This was the reason why the ministry wanted to try an alternative to 
regulation. The PROPER program, targeting water pollution, was launched in June 
1995. Its distinctive feature was the disclosure of information via a five-color code, in 
which each participating firm was assigned a color according to its environmental 
status. The system was designed with considerable care so that it could be readily 
understood and still convey enough information to influence behavior. The 
environmental authority’s staff understood that disclosing raw data could create 
interpretation problems among the public, yet a simple binary index—in compliance 
or out of compliance—would not do justice to all firms, especially those that had an 
excellent performance record and those that missed compliance by a narrow margin.  
As noted earlier, the grading system primarily built on the compliance status of firms 
with the environmental regulation. The presence of environmental management 
practices and clean technology were used as secondary criteria. Plants that self-
reported information on analysis of the effluent were viewed as cooperative and were, 
to some limited extend, rewarded in the grading process. Thus, Black was awarded to 
facilities that did not meet the legal standards and made virtually no pollution control 
                                                 
11 In 1991, a ministerial decree (KEP/MEN/03/1991) set effluent discharge standards for the various 
sectors. Water standards for the sectors analyzed in the paper are given in tables 2a and 2b. 
12 Pargal and Wheeler (1996) suggest that there is some form of informal control of polluting firms in 
Indonesia. They use plant level data from the period 1989-1990 and find a positive correlation between 
industrial pollution intensity and surrounding community characteristics (less polluting firms are found 
in more educated and richer communities).  
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effort. Red facilities had made some effort to reduce emissions but failed to meet legal 
standards and had insufficient reporting. Blue was given to facilities that met legal 
standards and had reasonably frequent reporting. Green was intended for the 
“proactive” companies and was awarded if pollution was 50% or less the required 
standards and the firm conducted good equipment maintenance, reporting, and 
environmental work. Gold would reward firms who were bellow 5% the legal 
standard and met international standards of environmental excellence,13 which in 
addition to the Green requirements implied the use of clean production technology, 
waste minimization, and pollution prevention activities. Besides releasing the ratings, 
BAPEDAL issued a simple one-page checklist on the environmental performance of 
the participating firms.14 To achieve the greatest impact on environmental quality, the 
environmental authority selected major polluters with the highest contributions to 
rivers’ pollution loads to participate in the scheme.15 
 In June 1995, 187 plants were given prior, private notification of their initial ratings 
and were told that the ratings would be publicly disclosed in December 1995 and at 
regular intervals thereafter. New firms were gradually included in the program until it 
reached 324 facilities in June 1998. Participation was compulsory for selected firms 
but also contained provisions for “opt-ins,” and a small number of additional firms 
joined the program voluntarily. 
BAPEDAL went to great lengths not to alienate or provoke industry but to be 
constructive and provide accurate and timely advice about what firms had to do to 
improve their ratings. Since industrial leaders were very influential during this period, 
                                                 
13 No Gold ratings were awarded during the period. See Afsah and Ratunanda (1999) for more details 
on the rankings.  
14 In a survey, managers said the checklist made them aware of their facilities’ environmental 
shortcomings. 
15 Note that the load distribution (tons/day) does not necessarily track the concentration distribution 
(mg/L), since water flows (L) are usually the most influential factor of load discharges.  
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there was also a conscious media strategy for the release of information and other 
aspects of public relations related to the program (Afsah et al. 1997b).16 
Tables 1a, 1b, and 1c show the evolution of the rankings of those firms that were rated 
four times from June 1995, when the program started, to June 1998, when the 
program closed. The tables show that the Black and Red facilities (noncompliance 
status) make up 65% of the sample in June 1995. This illustrates the lack of 
stringency in the previous regulatory system, since PROPER did not itself make any 
changes in emissions requirements. Table 1a shows an immediate positive response 
within the first six months of the program—even before full disclosure— particularly 
among Black and Red plants: 83% of the Black plants and 26% of the Red plants 
improved. One Black plant even managed to turn Blue in this short period. Note, 
however, that 31% of the Blue plants and 50% of the Green plants could not sustain 
their ratings.  
Table 1b shows a clearer trend of improvement in the longer period between June 
1995 and July 1997: not many more firms slipped in performance after that initial six-
month period. At the end of the period, the number of Black and Red firms had 
decreased significantly. We see a larger positive response among those firms that 
started off with a poor ranking than among those that started off with a good initial 
ranking. This accords well with the central idea behind the rating program as 
formulated by the BAPEDAL officer who conceived the program, Nabiel Makarim.17 
He had noted that Indonesia has a strong cultural taboo related to the shame of losing 
face, and thus bad publicity is a much more powerful instrument than good publicity: 
those firms that were already in compliance would not be heavily affected by the 
disclosure. The difference in response could also reflect increasing marginal 
                                                 
16 A limitation of this study that needs to be acknowledged is the lack of information on the possible 
influence of lobbying and pressure groups in PROPER. In this regard BAPEDAL appeared, at least at 
the time, to have a reputable name among the regulated community. It seems the designers of PROPER 
took a number of measures to protect the system from corruption: Information was processed in a 
sophisticated program that reduced human error and detected data inconsistencies. The staff of 
PROPER was highly qualified, small in number and closely knitted and inspection group members 
were constantly rotating. 
17 Nabiel Makarim was the Director of the PROPER program during the period studied in this paper 
and later became the Minister of Environment of Indonesia.  
12 
abatement costs: abatement activities are more difficult and expensive at advanced 
stages of cleanup. 
Table 1a. Change in ratings, June 1995 to December 1995 
December 1995  
June 1995 Black Red Blue Green Gold Total 
Black 1 4 1 0 0 6 
Red 1 75 27 0 0 103 
Blue 1 16 37 1 0 55 
Green 0 0 2 2 0 4 
Gold 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 3 95 67 3 0 168 
Table 1b. Change in ratings, June 1995 to July 1997  
July 1997  
June 1995 Black Red Blue Green Gold Total 
Black 0 2 4 0 0 6 
Red 3 59 40 1 0 103 
Blue 0 16 34 5 0 55 
Green 0 0 3 1 0 4 
Gold 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 3 77 81 7 0 168 
Table 1c. Change in ratings, June 1995 to June 1998  
June 1998  
June 1995 Black Red Blue Green Gold Total 
Black 0 5 1 0 0 6 
Red 1 63 37 2 0 103 
Blue 0 22 30 3 0 55 
Green 0 1 2 1 0 4 
Gold 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 1 91 70 6 0 168 
Note: Tables 1a, 1b, and 1c include data on firms that were rated in each of the  
           following  rating rounds: June 1995, December 1995, July 1997, and June 1998. 
 
Table 1c shows the last ratings for 1998, which may reflect the deepening financial 
crisis. The environmental performance of many firms deteriorated, although not 
necessarily to the initial levels of June 1995. The chaotic situation in Indonesia in late 
1997 and 1998 may have led firms to relax their abatement activities as they probably 
decided to concentrate on more urgent matters.  
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4. Testing the policy impact on pollution levels 
Although Tables 1a and 1b show a general improvement after implementation of the 
program, the trend cannot be taken as proof of PROPER’s success, since the 
improvements might have occurred even without the program. We therefore studied 
emissions before and after the program, using a panel data set of firms that 
participated in the program and a control group of firms that did not. With panel data 
we are less worried about heterogeneity of the firms, which is controlled for by firm-
specific effects, particularly those characteristics that are constant over time.18 This 
approach is rather convenient in our case, where information on individual 
determinants of pollution is limited and incomplete. The basic model we estimate is as 
follows:  
ititsiit ingSelfreportSectorTrendE ***)ln( 21 ββα ++=  
             
ititit properproper εββ +++ 2*1* 33  , 
where t indicates time, i indicates firm and s indicates sector. E is pollution 
concentration (mg/L). As stated earlier, firms’ fixed effects control for factors that 
determine pollution and vary across firms. A sector-specific time trend is included to 
allow for the possibility of separate trends in the pollution intensity of particular 
industrial sectors. Given that pollution control in Indonesia to some extent has relied 
on self-reported data, we use a dummy to control for the possibility of underreporting 
bias. The effect of the PROPER program is assessed through two dummy variables. 
The first captures the immediate response to the policy, taking the value of 1 one 
month after a firm joined the program; the second allows for a lagged response, taking 
the value of 1 six months after entry. Since we do not know of any external factors, 
such as other changes in environmental regulation that could have affected firms’ 
emissions, our specification does not include any time-specific effects except the time 
trend. The errors are assumed to be normally distributed. 
Note that in the PROPER program, water pollution is measured in terms of 
concentration (mg/L), rather than in total load (tons/day). For the ecosystem, load 
would generally be more important and relevant than concentration. Disadvantages of 
                                                 
18 This includes location characteristics such as surrounding communities’ levels of income and 
education 
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concentration as a measure include the possibilities that a firm could dilute its effluent 
to improve its rating, and that increases in production scale involving increased 
amounts of both pollution load and water could escape detection. The seeming 
independence of emissions concentration from production scale has allowed 
regulators around the world to set environmental standards for industrial sectors to 
make legislation simpler and to facilitate enforcement. Indonesia is not an exception, 
and the data collected for both the regulations and the color grading system refer to 
concentration rather than to load.  
5. Data 
Indonesia’s environmental authority, BAPEDAL, provided the information collected 
for the PROPER program and the earlier Clean River program. The period of analysis 
is June 1993 through June 1997. We selected this period because we wanted to avoid 
using information that was affected by the financial crisis, which is reported to have 
started in July 1997. We focus on emissions concentration as measured by 
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and chemical oxygen demand (COD),19 which 
are common water pollution indicators, for which data were available for an adequate 
number of firms both inside and outside PROPER. We first constructed two panels 
with monthly data for both pollutants. In the few cases where more than one reading 
was available for a given month, we selected the median of the readings. Since 
readings were not available for all 48 months of the period of analysis, we selected 
only those firms that had at least six readings before and six readings after June 1995. 
Among the selected firms, none had joined the program voluntarily. Tables 2a and 2b 
(in next page) present summary statistics of the data on pollution concentration. The 
BOD panel covers 132 facilities, of which 76 participated in the program. The COD 
panel covers 138 firms, with 82 being part of the program. In our sample, 34.5% of 
the BOD and 39.5% of the COD readings were self-reported. 
                                                 
19 Both indicators are measures of how much oxygen is needed to degrade a certain pollutant. There is 
no perfect, single indicator for pollution, and these measures may be irrelevant for some types of 
pollutants. They are nevertheless useful for the analysis of effluents from industries that release large 
quantities of biodegradable material.  
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The advantage of our data is that we have a double comparison: before and after as 
well as inside and outside the PROPER program. For the latter comparison to be truly 
valid, we would need to know how our sample relates to the whole population of 
polluting firms, since the comparison could be biased if the groups were not 
representative and comparable. We have used all the data available to us, excluding 
only polluters with very few readings, and the data set covers a large proportion of the 
firms that were considered of interest by the environmental authority: these were the 
significant polluters, particularly regarding water effluents. BAPEDAL had identified, 
as interesting, 1500-2000 firms most of which were already in the Clean River 
Program and which accounted for about 80% of total pollution. The plan was to 
gradually increase coverage to all these firms but BAPEDAL wanted to move 
carefully to maintain the quality and integrity of the program. They therefore started 
with a selection of less than 200 firms for the first year. These were chosen on the 
basis of being important polluters of course but the main criterion at this stage was 
that firms were located in regional clusters to minimize the travel cost for the 
inspectors and thus keep within the limited initial budget. As far as we have been able 
to ascertain, there is thus no other systematic difference between the firms in 
PROPER and those that participated in the Clean River program but not PROPER (N. 
Makarim, personal communication, 2006). It appears that PROPER started with a 
very small budget and simply could not deal with all polluters. In fact, during the 
period 1995 – 1998 the budget of the program increased by a factor of 2.2 and the 
number of firms in the program increased by a factor of 1.7.  
Table 2a. BOD concentration, summary statistics 
Sector Observations 
Environmental 
standard 
Mean  SD 
  (mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) 
     
Rubber 631 150 101 66 
Plywood 540 100 158 312 
Others 633 150 320 567 
Pulp and paper 550 150 185 327 
Textile 1,041 85 151 204 
Total 3,395  180 334 
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Table 2b. COD concentration, summary statistics 
Sector Observations 
Environmental 
standard  
Mean  SD 
  (mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) 
     
Rubber 676 300 142 302 
Plywood 607 250 650 121 
Others 655 300 1,107 422 
Pulp and paper 581 350 534 163 
Textile 1,029 250 764 362 
Total 3,548  142 314 
     
 
6. Results 
Table 3 presents the regression results for the pollutants BOD and COD. For each 
pollutant we estimate two models based on specific sub samples. The first sub sample 
covers firms that had poor environmental compliance records prior to implementation 
of the policy (and thus risked public embarrassment); the second sub sample covers 
the firms that exhibited a relatively good environmental record.20 Let us call the 
former group the initially noncompliant sub sample and the latter the initially 
compliant sub sample. By splitting the data this way, we acknowledge that pollution 
trends probably differ between firms that are at different stages of cleanup. Also, the 
magnitude and timing of the reaction to the policy may differ between the two sub 
samples. Finally, as discussed below, the incentives to underreport may be different 
between the two sub samples. In general, the explanatory power of the regressions is 
satisfactory and the estimations of the policy variables are consistent across 
regressions, although as expected, a great deal of the explanatory power of the 
regressions is due to firm-specific effects. Statistical tests show that splitting the data 
in such a way was appropriate. 
We use two PROPER participation dummy variables to capture the immediate and 
lagged reaction to the program. The first dummy variable takes the value of 1 one 
                                                 
20 If 75% or more of a firm’s readings in the June 1993–June 1995 period fell below the environmental 
standard, it was defined as having a poor environmental compliance record. The 75% figure was not 
arbitrary but related to the compliance record up to June 1995 of firms rated Blue or Green (compliant) 
and firms rated Black and Red (noncompliant).  
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month after a firm joined the program; the second dummy variable takes the value of 
1 six months after the entry. For the initially noncompliant firms, the effect of 
PROPER participation is an immediate reduction in emissions, followed by a further 
reduction. For the initially compliant sub sample, there is no immediate effect from 
entering the program, but we do observe a lagged effect. These results are consistent 
with a more urgent reaction to embarrassing news than to good news, or with an 
increasing marginal abatement cost function. If a firm has previously made little 
abatement effort, then simple changes in production processes not requiring capital 
investments could lead to significant and rapid emissions reductions. Firms in 
advanced stages of abatement have already achieved the easy reductions, and further 
reduction is technologically more difficult and expensive.  
Robustness 
Next we perform a simple robustness test on the PROPER participation variables to 
the length of the panels. Recall that the duration (48 months) and its close (June 1997) 
were selected to exclude information from the financial crisis period, and thus the 
panel covers exactly 24 months before and after the launch of the program. The longer 
the panel, the more likely it is to include unobserved effects that may affect pollution. 
We therefore estimated the models for several shorter panels to check the robustness 
of the PROPER variables. The panels were restricted in three ways, by excluding the 
first six months, the last six months, and the first and last six months. In the panels of 
firms with poor compliance histories (regressions 1 and 3 in Table 3), no significant 
changes in the policy parameters are observed. On the other hand, shortening the 
panels of firms with good compliance records (specifications 2 and 4 in Table 3) 
results in an insignificant lagged policy variable in some cases. Nevertheless, the 
negative sign is always preserved, and we can conclude that the estimations are 
reasonably robust in this respect. 
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Table 3. Explaining emissions concentration (log mg/L)  
 Dependent variable: Log(BOD)  Dependent variable: Log(COD)  
Variables (1) 
Sub sample 1 
(2) 
Sub sample 2 
(3) 
Sub sample 1 
(4) 
Sub sample 2 
   
PROPER, 1-month lag –0.178** 0.066 –0.186** –0.017 
 (0.084) (0.096) (0.090) (0.077) 
PROPER, 6-month lag –0.212** –0.302*** –0.218** –0.194** 
 (0.084) (0.098) (0.090) (0.079) 
     
Self-reported  –0.143*** –0.270*** –0.045 –0.046 
Reading (0.054) (0.070) (0.056) (0.059) 
     
Rubber trend –0.005 0.011** –0.007 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Plywood trend –0.014*** –0.003 –0.008* –0.005 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Others trend –0.019*** –0.008** –0.022*** –0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Paper trend 0.009** 0.010** 0.010** 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Textile trend –0.017*** 0.002 –0.013*** 0.007 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
Constant 5.355*** 3.750*** 6.112*** 4.516*** 
 (0.049) (0.088) (0.054) (0.075) 
     
Observations 2109 1286 2134 1414 
Total firms 85 47 86 52 
PROPER firms 44 32 45 37 
Control group firms 41 15 41 15 
R2 0.60 0.52 0.50 0.52 
Test equal parameters F( 8,  3247)=   6.73 F(  8,  3394) =    7.80 
Notes: Regressions include firms’ fixed effect dummies. Sub sample 1 (Sub sample 2) cover firms with poor 
(good) environmental compliance records prior to the PROPER program. “PROPER, 1-month lag” is a policy 
dummy that takes the value of 1 one month after a firm joined the program. “PROPER, 6-month lag” takes the 
value of 1 six months after a firm joined. The reported F- statistics have p-values lower than 0.00005. Standard 
errors are in parentheses.  
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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The total estimated reductions in pollution concentrations for the initially 
noncompliant firms were 32%21 and 33%22 for BOD and COD, respectively. In the 
group of firms with good compliance records, there was no immediate reaction, 
whereas a lagged reaction shows in some specifications. However, the estimations are 
strictly speaking, not robust enough to permit definite conclusions.  
When evaluating the effectiveness of a program, the question of selectivity bias arises. 
Would the participating firms have reduced their emissions to the same extent without 
the policy? To deal with this concern effectively, we have included time trends and 
included both firms inside and outside the program. The time trends are expected to 
capture the natural pollution tendency within sectors, leaving the policy dummy to 
account for the effect of the program. F tests reject the null hypothesis of equal time 
trends across sectors in the models. This is not surprising, since it is more natural to 
think of industrial sectors as technologically independent and evolving at independent 
paces.  
The reliability of self-reporting 
Our data include both self-reported and external readings. In our sample, 45% and 
55% of the BOD and COD readings of the initially compliant firms were self-
reported, whereas only 27% and 29% of the readings of the initially noncompliant 
firms were self-reported. It is natural that the environmental authority would seek to 
measure emissions of the noncompliant firms directly. The regression results show 
that self-reported concentration readings (BOD readings in particular) were 
significantly lower than readings taken by the environmental authorities. It also seems 
that the tendency for self-reported readings to be low was actually stronger in the 
initially compliant group (–24% compared with –13%), although the difference was 
not significant at a reasonable confidence level.23   
                                                 
21 Short-run BOD response = e-0.178-1= -0.163; lagged BOD response = e-0.212-1 = -0.191. Total BOD 
response = e-(0.178+0.212)-1= - 0.323. 
22 Short-run COD response = e-0.186-1= -0.170; lagged COD response = e-0.218-1 = -0.196  Total COD 
response = e-0.186-0.218-1 = -0.332 
23 Taking the 95% confidence limits underestimation for all firms would have been 4% – 33%. 
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The self-reporting variable is not significant in the COD panels. One reason may be 
that BOD standards are relatively tighter than COD standards, and firms find it more 
difficult to meet them. Another reason could be that the regulator relies more on BOD 
readings to assess firms’ environmental performance. Finally, the main policy 
variables (response to PROPER) are not particularly sensitive to the presence of the 
self-reporting dummy in the regressions, and thus our main conclusions still hold. 
Our model allows for separate pollution trends for each sector within the two sub 
samples. We find negative pollution trends in most sectors in the noncompliant group 
but mixed evidence in the compliant group. F tests reject the hypothesis of equal 
trends between the two sub samples.24 Thus the noncompliant firms have faster rates 
of decrease in pollution intensity in addition to their larger reaction to the PROPER 
program, reinforcing the impression that the main changes in emissions occurred in 
the initially noncompliant group. 
Emission reductions  
The analysis above was carried out in terms of emissions concentration—that is, the 
pollution intensity of effluents. Total pollution loads to the environment also depend 
on the flow of wastewater. In principle, concentrations can be reduced by increasing 
water flow. However, most of the plants studied have very large water flows, and 
further increases would lead to higher pumping and other costs. Data on water flows 
were somewhat incomplete but did not indicate more than a small increase of 10%, 
which may have been partly due to increases in production. Using the predicted policy 
effects on concentration levels and ex ante–ex post information on water flows for 44 
initially out-of-compliance firms in the program (which corresponds to 40% of the 
total noncompliant firms that were first included in the program), we calculate the 
effect of the policy on emissions. The estimated reduction in emissions loads due to 
PROPER participation was 6.2 tons per day for BOD and 11.6 tons per day for COD. 
These reductions were achieved despite the observed increase in water flows in the 
period following the policy.  
                                                 
24 More specifically, three out of five sector trends in the compliant group are significantly higher 
(either less negative or more positive) than the sector trends of the noncompliant group for both 
pollutants. The remaining two sector trends are not statistically different from each other.  
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7. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the effectiveness of Indonesia’s Program for Pollution 
Control Evaluation and Rating (PROPER) in reducing industrial water contamination. 
The PROPER program, which ran from 1995 to 1998, was a pioneering scheme in the 
developing world that used information disclosure to control industrial pollution. The 
evidence for the effectiveness of such schemes is still very limited, particularly in the 
developing world. We analyze actual changes in emissions concentrations (mg/L) due 
to the PROPER program using panel data techniques with plant-level data on a 
treatment group and a control group.  
The main finding of the paper is that the policy was indeed responsible for a reduction 
in emissions intensity as measured by biochemical oxygen demand and chemical 
oxygen demand, and that this reduction was particularly rapid and strong for those 
firms that initially had a poor compliance record. The total estimated reductions in 
pollution concentration for these firms were approximately 32% in BOD and COD. 
Further calculations using information on water flows for 44 firms (40% of the 
noncompliant firms that were initially in the program) show that the estimated 
reductions in concentration were equivalent to emissions reductions of 6.2 tons per 
day for BOD and 11.6 tons per day for COD.  
The third set of results concerns the importance of underreporting to explain 
emissions. Self-reported concentration readings, in particular BOD readings, tend to 
underestimate actual concentration levels. This points to the need for strategies to 
induce truthful reporting, even among those firms that already have a reputation of 
being green. Although self-reporting is more common in the (initially) compliant 
firms, no significant difference in the self-reporting variable was found between the 
two groups. Our findings are in line with recent evidence that suggests caution in 
interpreting studies evaluating programs built entirely on self-reporting such as the 
TRI in the U.S. (De March and Hamilton 2006).25  
It may be surprising that mere information disclosure and ratings had such a strong 
effect. Apparently, reputation is not just a rich-country issue; in fact, it may be more 
                                                 
25 The authors undertook a comparative analysis between TRI data and data from ambient pollution 
monitors and conclude that plants are not always reporting accurate estimates of their emissions.  
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important in economies where judicial institutions and insurance markets are weak. 
We do not know whether the effects depend on the relative ease with which firms that 
have not previously controlled emissions can achieve abatement, or on firms’ 
perceptions that the rating program signaled tougher regulation ahead. Blackman et al. 
(2004) find some support for the latter explanation and also attributes the effects to 
other mechanisms, such as pressure from shareholders and neighbors.   
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Abstract 
This paper analyzes differences in firm responsiveness to PROPER, Indonesia’s 1995-
98 program for industrial pollution control. The overall effectiveness of this program 
at achieving emissions reductions, and its low regulatory costs, have earned it a good 
reputation around the world. PROPER was characterized by the presence of no 
deterrents or incentives other than those caused indirectly by the public provision of 
information on the environmental performances of firms. We analyze plant level data 
to relate short and longer term environmental responses to facility characteristics. The 
results reveal that foreign-owned firms and firms located in densely populated 
regions, in particular in Java, were more likely to respond positively to the scheme. 
Whereas foreign ownership is a determinant of both short and longer term responses, 
location is only important in the shorter term. Also, facilities that had already taken 
the first abatement steps found it more difficult to produce further positive responses.  
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1. Introduction 
Indonesia’s 1995-98 Program for Pollution Control Evaluation and Rating (PROPER) 
was the first major scheme in the developing world that used information disclosure 
to reduce industrial pollution. Its apparent effectiveness at achieving emissions 
reductions and its low regulatory costs earned it a good reputation. At the time, the 
program was viewed as an inspiring experiment and a number of countries set out to 
emulate it (World Bank, 2000).1 The early claims of the success of the scheme have 
however been challenged due to the possibility of other factors, not related to 
PROPER, being responsible for the observed reductions in emissions. Recently, 
García et al (2004) addressed this issue and studied the change in emissions before 
and after the program, using treatment and control groups of firms in side and outside 
the scheme. The authors concluded that there was indeed a strong, positive response 
to the PROPER scheme, in particular among firms with poor environmental 
compliance histories. 
In this article we take a step further in an attempt to uncover some of the 
characteristics of those firms that showed higher susceptibility to PROPER. More 
broadly, we seek to contribute to the understanding of provision of information 
programs and the mechanisms through which they work.2 It has been argued that 
disclosure triggers or intensifies interactions among firms, workers, community 
groups, consumers, and investors, increasing the expected costs of polluting activities 
through channels that do not directly involve the regulator (Tietenberg, 1998; Sterner, 
2003). The empirical literature has however only found a determining role of financial 
markets in provision of information programs. A number of studies report negative 
effects on stock prices for heavy polluters following a release of information. Khanna 
                                                 
1 The U.S. Toxics Release Inventory Program, which has run since 1988, was the first and most notable 
public disclosure program in the world. However, until PROPER it was not realized that provision of 
information programs could be successfully implemented in countries with relatively weak 
governmental institutions and imperfect markets.  
2 Portney (2000) identifies public dissemination of information as one of the three enduring changes in 
environmental policy over the 2000 – 2050 period. The other two are the increased use of market-
oriented approaches, such as emission fees and tradable emission permits, and the increased 
decentralization of environmental institutions.  
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et al. (1998), Hamilton (1995), and Konar and Cohen (1997) analyze the U.S. TRI 
Program; Lanoie et al. (1998) study the effects of the list of polluters published by the 
Ministry of Environment of British Columbia, Canada. Dasgupta et al. (2001) show 
that stock markets in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and the Philippines react to 
announcements of information on environmental events. Among these studies, only 
Konar and Cohen (1997) consider the possible effects on emissions and find that bad 
publicity is not only followed by falling stock prices but also by emissions reductions; 
further, the greater the fall in stock price, the larger the observed emissions reduction. 
The somewhat robust evidence on the links between financial markets and 
environmental disclosure contrasts with the apparent lack of studies testing the 
influence of other channels such as community or worker pressure.3 A paper that 
looks at the links between communities and environmental outcomes in the context of 
the U.S. TRI program is Arora and Cason (1999). However, that study does not 
disentangle the effects of information availability itself on emissions.  The unbalance 
in the current empirical evidence may reflect the difficulties to obtain certain types of 
data and not necessarily the relative importance of the different channels. It is 
however important to recognize that stock prices, in principle, reflect the value of the 
firm and contain information on the present and future stream of net benefits related 
to the above-mentioned channels.   
In this article we analyze differences in firm responsiveness to PROPER (1995-1998). 
We use a data set collected within PROPER that contains information on facility 
characteristics and environmental outcomes before and after the disclosure of 
information. In June 1995, the plants that were selected to participate in the scheme 
were given prior, private notification of their ratings as of that date. They were also 
informed that updated ratings would be publicly disclosed in December 1995 and at 
regular intervals thereafter. We use the first evaluation round as a baseline to analyze 
                                                 
3 Blackman et al. (2004) present results of a manager survey carried out within the context of PROPER 
in 1998. Managers were asked to rank mechanisms that could have been influential in the program. 
Among the mechanisms most frequently ranked first or second were: the program aroused managers’ 
awareness of environmental problems, bad ratings increased pressure from communities, and bad 
ratings increased pressure from the news media. Pressure from shareholders also appeared to be 
important.  
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the changes in environmental performance observed in the two subsequent evaluation 
and disclosure rounds. We construct two response indexes for the June - December 
1995 and the June 1995 – July 1997 periods, and use them as dependent variables in 
ordered logit models. Lagged firms’ characteristics that are correlated with the 
channels through which disclosure works are implemented as regressors.    
Our findings indicate that firms with foreign ownership were more likely to respond  
positively way to PROPER. This result is somewhat in line with the existing evidence 
on stock market reaction as it involves pressure from foreign investors, for which a 
bad environmental reputation is particularly costly. This effect seems quite important 
in PROPER as it is found in both short and longer run response models. A second 
finding is that firms located in Java (which concentrates most of Indonesia’s 
population and economic activity) and in other densely populated provinces 
responded to a larger extent than other firms. This reinforces the impression that one 
of the key mechanisms in disclosure may be community pressure, which can be 
stronger in more densely populated areas where more people are negatively affected 
by pollution. The importance of location variables is only found in the short term 
response models though.  Finally, the results also suggest that the firms that had 
already taken their first “easy” abatement steps found it more difficult to achieve 
further improvements. This confirms similar findings reported in García et al. (2004). 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes information disclosure as a policy 
instrument and its potential in a developing country context. Section 3 presents an 
overview of the program to be evaluated. Section 4 presents the empirical approach, 
Section 5 reports the data, and Section 6 discusses the results. Section 7 concludes.  
2.  Disclosure as a policy instrument 
Garvie and Keeler (1994) argue that the environmental regulator can be viewed as an 
institution that solves an information asymmetry between polluters and the judiciary. 
This not only refers to the command-and-control of standards but also to market based 
instruments, since a reliable monitoring system is a necessary condition for their 
successful implementation. Typically, the “classical” regulator would allocate the 
budget in two different activities: (i) monitoring and enforcement, and (ii) actual 
process of prosecuting firms. However polluting firms face many other costs of 
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pollution, costs that may be much more important than just environmental fees or 
fines associated with traditional regulations. Firms have relations with (a) surrounding 
communities and participate in (b) inputs and output markets, (c) labour markets, and 
(d) credit markets. Successful experiences like PROPER in Indonesia and the TRI in 
the U.S. suggest that regulators can help intensify these relations and use disclosure of 
information as a substitute for enforcement. It is a well-established fact that 
information plays a determining role in the development of institutions such as 
markets.   
The natural framework of an analysis of the relations between polluters and 
communities is the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960). Provision of information can reduce 
transaction costs between communities and neighboring plants, placing the former in 
a better position to negotiate pollution reductions.  This mechanism can be very 
relevant in the developing world with ill-functioning official institutions and where 
informal mechanisms are more likely to emerge. The public good nature of 
information also makes disclosure reach social and economic spheres that stretch 
beyond neighboring communities (Tietenberg, 1998). In the presence of disclosure, 
environmentally aware consumers are able to identify and, if preferred, purchase 
greener products. Probably this mechanism works when the industries produce 
consumer products, but reputation could be important for firms producing inputs for 
other firms as well.  Employees could also be encouraged to negotiate higher 
workplace standards after learning the environmental standing of firms. Investors will 
make decisions based on previous issues and other sensitivities. They will, for 
instance, worry about hidden liabilities of polluters and loss of goodwill associated 
with pollution. They could also view excess pollution as a signal of inefficiency. As 
explained in Section 1, the bulk of the empirical literature on disclosure shows that 
financial markets do react to bad environmental news. 
In the context of Indonesia, and typically of any developing country, pressure from 
workers and consumers related to the environmental performance seems less likely. 
Unemployment was still high in the mid 1990s and the economy, although 
invigorated in the 1980s and 1990s, remained rather poor. Without the possibility of 
participating in a more competitive job market, workers cannot afford to make high 
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demands.4 Pressure from consumers might not be expected either as most firms 
participating in PROPER were producers of intermediate goods. Furthermore, green 
consumerism is not very developed in poorer countries. On the other hand, there are 
reasons to believe that communities and investors could have played a more important 
role in PROPER. Pargal and Wheeler (1996) have already provided some evidence on 
the possible existence of some forms of informal control of polluting firms in 
Indonesia. Their study suggests that wealthier and more educated surrounding 
communities can impose higher pressure on polluting firms. As for possible investor 
reaction, the observed regularity of stock markets being responsive to environmental 
disclosure suggests that this channel could also have been at work in PROPER. In 
fact, Dasgupta et al. (2001) show that financial markets do react to bad environmental 
news in neighboring Philippines. Finally, the answer to the question about whether 
communities and investors were important forces in PROPER can only be found 
through an empirical analysis.   
3.  Indonesia’s PROPER program5 
In the early 1990s the national environmental authority of Indonesia (BAPEDAL) was 
faced with the discrepancy between an expanding industrial sector  and its own lack 
of resources, and decided to tackle industrial emissions control through an 
information disclosure program. Earlier attempts at regulation had not been very 
successful; no fines were ever assessed and the authorities lost 90% of the 
environmental and health court cases. This was the reason why BAPEDAL wanted to 
try an alternative to regulation. The PROPER program was launched in June 1995 and 
aimed to achieve water pollution reductions at minimum regulatory costs. To achieve 
the greatest impact on environmental quality, BAPEDAL selected the major 
contributors to river pollution loads to participate in the scheme. The distinctive 
feature of PROPER was the disclosure of information via a five-color code, in which 
                                                 
4 Although the official rate of unemployment was 3% in 1994, the underemployment rate was 
estimated to be 40%. The latter includes unemployed and those working involuntarily part time for 
economic reasons or working for poverty-level pay. 
5 This section builds on García et al. (2004). For a detailed description of the PROPER program and the 
Indonesian regulatory regime in the 1980s and 1990s, see Afsah et al. (1997) and Afsah and Vincent 
(1997). 
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each participating firm was assigned a color according to its environmental status. The 
scale built primarily on the compliance status with existing pollution standards.6 
Implementation of environmental management practices, such as the existence of flow 
meters and self reporting of reliable data, was also considered. The environmental 
authority understood that disclosing raw data could create interpretation problems 
among the public. Yet a simple binary index—in compliance or out of compliance—
would not do justice to all firms, especially not to those that had an excellent 
performance record and those that missed compliance by a narrow margin.  
Black meant that the facilities did not meet the legal standards and made virtually no 
pollution control effort. Red facilities had made some effort to reduce emissions but 
failed to meet legal emissions standards and had insufficient reporting. Blue was 
given to facilities that met legal emissions standards and had reasonably frequent 
reporting. Green was intended for the “proactive” companies and was awarded if 
pollution was 50% or less than the required standards and the firm conducted good 
equipment maintenance, reporting, and environmental work. Gold was awarded to 
firms that were below 5% of the legal standard and met international standards of 
environmental excellence, which in addition to the green requirements implied the use 
of clean production technology, waste minimization, and pollution prevention 
activities.7  
BAPEDAL identified 1,500-2,000 firms that accounted for about 80% of total 
pollution. The plan was to gradually increase the coverage to all these firms, but 
BAPEDAL wanted to move carefully in order to maintain the quality and integrity of 
the program. They therefore started with a selection of firms in the first year. These 
were of course chosen on the basis of being significant polluters, but another 
important criterion at this stage was that the firms had to be located in regional 
clusters to minimize the travel cost for the inspectors and thus keep within the limited 
initial budget. In June 1995, 187 large polluting plants were notified of their initial 
ratings and were told that full disclosure of the ratings would be made in December 
1995. New firms were gradually included in the program until it reached 324 facilities 
                                                 
6 In 1991, a ministerial decree (KEP/MEN/03/1991) set effluent discharge standards in terms of 
concentration (mg/L) for a number of industrial sectors.  
7 See Afsah and Ratunanda (1999) for more details on the rankings. 
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in June 1998. The program collapsed in 1998 with the Asian financial crisis, but is 
currently being currently revived. Participation was compulsory for the selected firms 
but ratings for “opt-ins” were as well made, and a small number of additional firms 
joined the program voluntarily. Initial ratings indicated that two-thirds of the 
companies were noncompliant and were given Red or Black ratings. In December 
1995, full disclosure of all the ratings started, industry by industry, to receive 
maximum press coverage during a fairly extended time period. The changes in 
rankings, for the 145 firms used in the empirical exercise of this paper, from June 
1995 to December 1995 and July 1997 are shown in Tables 1A and 1B. No Gold 
ratings were awarded during the period. Table 1A shows an immediate, positive 
response during the first six months of the program particularly among Black- and 
Red-rated plants. All but one of the Black ratings improved and moved up. More 
firms adjusted and improved in the longer run. Note that a fairly similar number of 
firms declined in their environmental performance in both the short and longer terms.8  
Table 1A Change in ratings June 1995 vs. December 1995  
Rating 
June 1995 
  
        Decline          No change           Improve                     Total 
 
 
   Black 
     Red 
    Blue 
   Green 
    Gold 
   Total 
 
      -           1           4 (1)          5 
      1          66          23             90 
     13          32           1             47 
      1 (1)       2           0              3 
      0           0           -              0 
     16         101           28           145 
Notes: Tables 1A and 1B include the 145 firms that are used in the empirical analysis done in 
this paper. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of firms that improved or decline 
two ratings with respect to their initial rating in June 1995. For instance, in December 1995 four 
firms improved from black to red and one from black to blue. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 As mentioned earlier, PROPER has been considered a reasonably cheap experiment. The average 
annual budget of the program during the 1995 - 1998 period was US$200,000, which translates into a 
cost of US$740 per firm per year. Sixty-five percent of the budget was allocated to monitoring and 
inspection activities, 15% to laboratory tests and 20% to information processing and administration. 
During the 1995 – 1998 period the budget increased by a factor of 2.2, whereas the number of firms in 
the program increased by a factor of 1.7. 
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Table 1B Change in ratings June 1995 vs. July 1997  
Rating 
June 1995 
  
        Decline          No change           Improve                     Total 
  
 
   Black 
     Red 
    Blue 
   Green 
    Gold 
   Total 
 
      -           0           5 (4)          5  
      3          50          37 (1)         90 
     13          29           5             47 
      2           1           0              3 
      0           0           -              0 
     18          80          47            145 
4.  Empirical approach.  
We use the first round of PROPER in June 1995, where facilities were evaluated but 
information was not disclosed, as a benchmark. The changes in the environmental 
performance of firms after implementing of the program can be analyzed in a number 
of different ways. One way is to focus on emissions themselves, which would be the 
ultimate goal for a policy maker. However, for the firms operating under this labeling 
scheme, and for most other stakeholders, it is reasonable to think that their main focus 
of attention is related to the rating itself, and therefore our empirical approach 
concentrates on these ratings. The ratings are of course based on emissions but also on 
the implementation of some environmental management practices. Note that the 
ratings are based on wide emission intervals, which means that the goal of the firm 
may not be so much a general reduction of emissions but rather to get just below a 
certain limit that corresponds to the desired rating (perhaps with some margin to 
hedge against any uncertainty of emission metering).  
Let itE  be a continuous variable that measures the environmental performance of firm 
i at time t. Higher values of itE  indicate better performance. We are primarily 
interested in changes of this variable that could be attributed to information provision. 
Thus, the change in environmental performance between t = 0, without disclosure, 
and t = 1, some time later with disclosure, can be represented as 1 0i i iE E E∆ = − . Note 
that this can be positive or negative. Some firms may actually increase emissions and 
decrease their environmental performance as a response to other (unobserved) factors. 
Let itR  be a PROPER rating variable that takes discrete consecutive values for each 
color category: 1 for Black, 2 for Red, up to 5 for Gold. itR  will be a reflection of the 
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underlying variable itE , but the latter may change without a change in rating. There 
will be a change in rating only if the change in emissions is sufficiently large. Our 
empirical model assumes that the response to the policy, iE∆ , depends on a number 
of exogenous variables, iX , related to firm characteristics and the different channels 
through which disclosure works. Also, we include the initial environmental 
performance 0iE  in order to control for increasing marginal abatement costs effects. 
The structural model in our specification is thus given by:  
0i i i iE X Eβ γ ε′∆ = + + ,        (1) 
where the vector β  and the scalar γ  represent the parameters, and iε  is the error 
term.9 We devise the change in rating iR∆  as a reflection of the change in 
environmental performance iE∆ . As discussed in the previous section, facilities 
participating in PROPER can typically be classified into three groups: those that 
improved their ratings, those that did not change it and those whose ratings declined. 
We maintain this classification to define the dependent variable of our econometric 
specification. Thus:  
iR

∆ = 


 
1
 0
+1
−
    if    
1
1 2
2
i
i
i
E
E
E
µ
µ µ
µ
−∞ ≤ ∆ ≤
< ∆ ≤
< ∆ ≤ ∞
 ,     (2) 
where 1µ  and 2µ  are threshold parameters to be estimated along with β  and γ  in 
equation (1). Note that the coding of iR∆  is irrelevant as long as the order of the three 
outcomes is preserved. The coding we use in equation (2) is meant to remind the 
                                                 
9 A model that has sometimes been used within the context of public disclosure programs is:  
 1i i iE Xβ ε′= +  
See for instance Arora and Cason (1999). Note that the dependent variable is given by the absolute 
level of emissions in period t = 1, when information has already been provided. This specification, 
although useful for several purposes, does not permit inferring the incremental contributions of the 
different factors associated with information provision. Disentangling the informational effects requires  
data on the environmental performance of firms under non-disclosure. 
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reader of the directions of the changes in ratings. The error term is assumed to have a 
standard logistic distribution across observations. The probabilities of observing the 
three different outcomes are given by:  
0 0
0 1 0 0
0 2 0
Pr( 1  |  , ) ( )
Pr(   0  |  , ) ( ) ( )
Pr( 1  |  , ) 1 ( )
i i i i i
i i i i i i i
i i i i i
R X E F X E
R X E F X E F X E
R X E F X E
β γ
µ β γ β γ
µ β γ
′∆ = − = − −
′ ′∆ = = − − − − −
′∆ = + = − − −
 , (3) 
where F is the cumulative logistic distribution function. These probabilities are used 
to construct the likelihood function and carry out the estimation.    
5.  Data  
The local Environmental Authority BAPEDAL provided the information collected 
within the PROPER program.  We use data on 145 firms that were rated in the first 
(June 1995), second (December 1995), and forth (July 1997) rounds of the program. 
The third round of evaluation (June 1996) only included a small number of firms; we 
were not able to use the data in the analysis. Note also that the Asian financial crisis is 
reported to have started in July 1997. Since the information used to construct the 
ratings is typically collected in advance, the data set is not contaminated by this event.   
Table 2 presents the specification and descriptive statistics of the variables included in 
the analysis. The upper and lower panels include information on the dependent and 
independent variables respectively. We construct two dependent variables, ∆Rating6 
and ∆Rating25, based on the reported changes in ratings in the first six and the first 25 
months of the program (June 1995 - December 1995 and June 1995 - July 1995). The 
difference in means indicates a higher positive response in the longer term. 
In the discussion in Section 3, two factors, namely community groups and investors, 
were identified as potential drivers of the general positive response to the scheme. We 
use two proxies to capture these two channels. The first one is a location variable that 
measures the population density in the provinces where the firms were located. This, 
we believe, is a reasonable way to look at the effects of community pressure, since 
highly populated areas are usually the most affected by pollution. We built a set of 
three dummy variables: The first one accounts for one for provinces with more than 
500 persons per square kilometer, which corresponds to provinces in Java, Indonesia’s 
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main island and one of the most densely populated places on earth.10  The second and 
third dummy variables are for firms located in provinces with population densities 
between 100 and 500 persons per square kilometer and less than 100 persons per 
square kilometer, respectively.  
Table 2. Variable specification and descriptive statistics. 
Number of firms = 145 
Variable Mean S. Dev.  
 
Description 
 
 
Reaction to PROPER 
 
   ∆Rating6            0.08     0.548    Change in rating between June 1995                            
.                                        and December 1995. The coding is: 
.                                        1=improve;0=nochange;-1=decline 
   ∆Rating25           0.20     0.640    Change in rating between June 1995                
.                                        and July 1997. The coding is:  
.                                        1=improve;0=nochange;-1=decline 
 
 
 Explanatory variables 
 
   Initial_rating      0.655    0.477    1=black or red; 0=no 
   Employment          1299     1933     Number of employees 
   Ownership 
     Public            0.176    0.382    1=yes; 0=no 
     Private (local)   0.693    0.462    1=yes; 0=no 
     Foreign           0.129    0.336    1=yes(with foreign share); 0=no 
   Sector    
     Sugar             0.102    0.303    1=yes; 0=no 
     Rubber            0.170    0.376    1=yes; 0=no 
     Plywood           0.149    0.357    1=yes; 0=no 
     PalmOil           0.081    0.274    1=yes; 0=no 
     PulpPaper         0.122    0.328    1=yes; 0=no 
     Textile           0.231    0.423    1=yes; 0=no 
     Other             0.142    0.351    1=yes; 0=no 
   Population density 
     High (Java)       0.524    0.501    1=yes(high popul density); 0=no  
     Medium            0.117    0.322    1=yes(medium popul density); 0=no  
     Low               0.358    0.483    1=yes(low popul density); 0=no  
 
We use an ownership variable as a proxy for investor pressure. The hypothesis is that 
firms that are, for instance, state-owned as opposed to private-owned, are less likely to 
                                                 
10 The population of Indonesia in the mid-1990s was around 200 million making it the fourth most 
populated country in the world. Around 35% of the population lived in urban areas. The Indonesian 
archipelago comprises approximately 17,500 islands, of which only 6,000 are inhabited. The four 
major islands are Java, Sumatera, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi (Central Bureau Of Statistics (CBS) 
[Indonesia] et. al, 1998) 
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face pressure from shareholders, namely the government. We construct three dummy 
variables: one for state owned firms, one for local private owned firms and one for 
firms with some share of foreign ownership. We acknowledge that our measure of 
investor pressure is not necessarily perfect since firm abatement costs, and therefore 
responsiveness ability to the program, may also have been determined by ownership.11 
On the other hand, it is not clear that foreign-owned firms would have lower 
abatement costs at the margin, especially if they had already undertaken the first 
abatement steps.  
Other explanatory variables are initial rating, employment, and industrial sector. The 
initial rating variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm was 
rated either Black or Red in the first PROPER round in June 1995. Tables 1A and 1B 
show that only 3 (2%) and 5 (3%) were given black and green colors in that round, 
respectively; therefore we decided to put them in the same categories with Red-rated 
and Blue-rated firms, respectively. This environmental performance dummy variable 
actually indicates whether a firm was initially in or out of compliance. The industrial 
sector dummy is mainly included to control for possible differences in abatement 
costs and reaction capabilities across sectors. Note though that the need to control for 
such factors, although necessary, is less important in our model. The reason is that in 
Indonesia emission standards are stated in concentrations (mg/L) and differ across 
sectors in such a way that the difficulties to comply are somewhat evened out. 
Employment is included as a measure of firm size. Larger firms could be more likely 
to be affected by bad publicity. It is difficult to argue that this variable measures 
possible economies of scale in abatement since pollution intensity (mg/L) is a 
measure that controls for firm size.  
 
                                                 
11 Takii (2002) finds that foreign-owned firms in Indonesia had higher technology levels than local 
owned firms in 1995. Bernard and Sjöholm (2003) report higher levels of (labor) productivity of 
foreign firms compare to local enterprises in the country in the 1975 - 1989 period. Apparently this gap 
in productivity increased over time. 
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6.  Results 
Table 3 presents full information maximum likelihood estimates for both the six and 
25e month response ordered logit models. Using a threshold probability value of 0.5, 
the estimated models correctly predict 72% and 62% of the short and longer term 
responses, respectively.  Explicitly, the observed actions and predicted actions are 
(prediction in brackets): 
6 month response: decline 16 (9), no change 101(126), and improve 28(10).  
25 month response:  decline 18(7), no change 80(90), and improve 47(48). 
Table 3. Ordered logit estimates 
6 month response
 
25 month response
 VARIABLE 
      Coefficient                SE     Coefficient                 SE 
 
Initial_rating 
Log_employment 
Ownership 
Public 
Foreign 
Density 
High (Java) 
Medium 
Sector 
Sugar 
Rubber 
Plywood 
PulpPaper 
Textile 
Other 
 
4.393 ***    0.861 
0.044        0.202 
 
1.325        0.869 
1.894 ***    0.685 
 
2.439 ***    0.950 
1.676 **     0.837 
 
0.459        1.334 
1.833 *      1.088 
3.347 **     1.315 
0.031        1.306 
0.779        1.236 
1.079        1.092 
  
 2.608 ***    0.512 
 0.019        0.186 
  
 0.218        0.718 
 1.551 **     0.629 
  
 0.219        0.819 
-0.308        0.697 
  
 1.226        1.159 
 1.724 **     0.852 
 1.207        1.031 
 0.699        1.101 
-0.124        1.057 
 0.662        0.909 
 
U1 
U2 
2.802        1.584 
    8.682        1.918 
    0.290        1.338 
    3.936        1.388 
Sample size 
Log_likelihood  
Pseudo R2 
145 
-84.54 
0.283 
145 
-111.79 
0.190 
Notes: The omitted dummy variables are: Private (local) in the ownership set of variables, Low in the 
population density variables, and PalmOil in the sector variables. Pseudo R2 is the likelihood ratio 
index 1 – ln L / ln L0, where L and L0 are the log likelihoods with and without regressors .  
* Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
These predictions should be read with some reservation given that a majority of the 
observations in our sample fall in the no-change category. In this case, prediction of 
the other two outcomes is less likely than in a balanced data. While the no-change 
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outcome is pretty well predicted by the two models, as expected, the improvement 
category is much better predicted in the 25 month response model. The seemingly 
poor predictability of the decline category in the two models may be related to 
unobserved factors and the randomness embedded in this outcome. Firms that have 
some financial or technological problems, or that must meet a peak of demand for 
their product, may increase pollution intensity despite the incentives given by 
PROPER. 
The ordinal regressions estimates of Table 3 provide a general idea of the direction of 
the effects of the different variables. Positive estimates invariably indicate a higher 
likelihood of a positive response;12 that is, a higher probability of improving, 
1R∆ = + , and a lower probability of declining, 1R∆ = − . Some regularities can be 
identified between the two regressions.13 Firms that were initially out-of-compliance 
and have foreign shares, as opposed to being national private, were more likely to 
respond positively. Also, most sector dummies are positive but rarely significant in 
our regressions. The two location variables were positive and significant in the first 
model, but not in the second model, signifying a stronger short-term positive response 
of those firms situated in densely populated areas. The two location dummy variables 
of the 6 month response model, although not significantly different from each other, 
suggest a larger effect of Java.14  
                                                 
12 The signs of the coefficients of ordinal regression models only give unambiguous information on the 
changes in probabilities in the two extreme categories (Greene, 2003). No inference about the 
intermediate outcomes can be made. Note though that our model has only three categories and the in-
between category is, by construction, directly associated with the initial environmental states of the 
firms. This allows us to read the estimates in terms of contributions to the likelihood of observing 
positive responses, as compared to the initial environmental state.  
13  Direct interpretation of the magnitude of the parameters across the two regressions is not possible 
due to probable differences in the variances of the latent variables, which might be represented as 
6iE∆ and 25iE∆ . 
14 It should be acknowledged that the estimates of the longer-term response model are more likely to be 
affected by noise and unobservable factors. For instance, Garcia et al. (2004) find evidence on the 
existence of negative trends in industrial water emissions in Indonesia in the same period of analysis.   
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Since our model is of probability, the sizes of the estimates of the ordinal regressions 
are difficult to interpret in terms of stimulus to the “unobserved” latent variables 6iE∆  
and 25iE∆ . We thus turn to study estimated marginal effects which, ultimately, break 
down the regression estimates into contributions to each one of the response 
probabilities (see Table 4). The marginal effects related to the improvement (decline) 
outcome indeed have the same (opposite) signs as the ordinal regression estimates in 
Table 3. For our only continuous variable, namely employment, the marginal estimate 
measures a partial increase in the “absolute” probability of observing a given outcome 
due to a percentage change in the number of employees. Employment, however, 
appears non-significant throughout the analysis. For dummy variables, the marginal 
effects are calculated as differences in probabilities of a given outcome for the two 
possible values of the variables.  
All but one of the marginal effects (that of the initial rating) of the no-change category 
have the same signs as those of the decline outcome. This suggests similar roles of the 
determinants of both these categories. Note however that the significance levels of 
some variables vary widely across categories.  
It is found that the initial rating has a very large and significant effect on both the 
probabilities of observing improvements and declines. Being rated Black or Red in 
June 1995, as opposed to Blue or Green, increases the likelihood of improvement by 
29.2% in December 1995 and by 40.6% in July 1995. Accordingly, the probability of 
observing a decline is reduced by 34.0% and 25.5%, respectively. The initial rating 
also has a negative significant effect on the probability of observing the no-change 
outcome in the 25 month response model, whereas no significance is found in the 
shorter term period of six months. This reinforces the idea that the inertia that tends to 
keep firms at their initial performance levels becomes less pressing over time. As 
Tables 1A and 1B show, both non-compliant firms (Red and Black) and compliant 
ones (Blue and Green) were more likely to improve in the longer time period. Non-
compliant firms appeared to have been relatively more responsive as time passed.15 
                                                 
15 The decline outcome is not observable for firms with initial black ratings. Note that the proportion of 
black firms in our sample is very small (5.02% of total firms rated black or red). Their inclusion in the 
analysis does not bias the econometric results.    
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Table 4. Estimated marginal effects 
VARIABLE 
Decline 
 
1R∆ = −  
No change
 
0R∆ =  
Improve
 
1R∆ =  
6 month response model 
   
Initial_rating 
Log_employment 
Ownership 
   Public 
   Foreign 
Population density 
   High (Java) 
   Medium 
Sector 
   Sugar 
   Rubber 
   Plywood 
   PulpPaper 
   Textile 
   Other 
-0.340 *** 
-0.001 
 
-0.026 
-0.031 
 
-0.087 
-0.028 * 
 
-0.011 
-0.033 * 
-0.045 
-0.001 
-0.018 
-0.022 
 
 0.048 
-0.002 
 
-0.122 
-0.227 
 
-0.116 * 
-0.191 
 
-0.031 
-0.202 
-0.521 ** 
-0.002 
-0.055 
-0.0942 
 
0.292 *** 
0.003     
 
0.148     
0.258 *   
 
0.204 **  
0.219     
 
0.041     
0.234 **  
0.566     
0.002     
0.073     
0.116 
25 month response model 
 
 
 
Initial_rating 
Log_employment 
Ownership 
   Own_Public 
   Own_Foreign 
Population density 
   High (Java) 
   Medium  
Sector 
   Sugar 
   Rubber 
   Plywood 
   PulpPaper 
   Textile 
   Sect_Others 
-0.258 *** 
-0.001 
 
-0.013 *** 
-0.063 
 
-0.014 
 0.021 
 
-0.052 
-0.072 ** 
-0.054 
-0.035 
 0.008 
-0.034 
 
-0.148 ** 
-0.002 
 
-0.030 
-0.289 ** 
 
-0.028 
 0.034 
 
-0.225 
-0.316 * 
-0.215 
-0.114  
 0.015 
-0.106 
 0.406 *** 
 0.003  
  
 0.043  
 0.353 ** 
 
 0.042  
-0.056  
 
 0.278  
 0.388 ** 
 0.270  
 0.150  
-0.023  
 0.141 
Notes: Marginal effects are estimated at the means of other dependent variables. The omitted 
dummy variables are: Private (local) in the ownership set of variables, Low in the population 
density variables, and Palm Oil in the sector variables.  
* Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Foreign ownership, as opposed to private local ownership, explains the improvement 
but not the decline in the short and longer term models. The importance of ownership 
in explaining the improvement category is more significant and apparently stronger in 
the 25 month response model; being foreign-owned increases the probability of 
improvement by 25.8% in the June-December 1995 period and by 35.3% in the June 
1995 – July 1997 period. Although these estimates are consistently higher than those 
of the public ownership dummy variable, no statistical difference between the two is 
found. Foreign ownership exhibits a large, negative, and significant effect for the no-
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change category in the 25 month response model whereas no significance is reported 
in the 6 month response model. Also, public-owned firms appear less likely to decline 
in their performance than private-owned firms in the longer term. However, the 
associated marginal effect is almost negligible, 1.3%. 
As for the location variables, significant effects are only found in the six month period 
model. The significant results show that whereas being located in Java increases the 
probability of observing an improvement outcome by 20.4% (and reduces the 
probability of a no-change outcome by 11.6%), being in less populated islands 
decreases the probability of decline outcomes by 3.8%. The reported loss in 
significance of these variables in the 25 month response model could be due to either 
a fallback in performance of those firms located in the most densely populated 
provinces or to improvements made by firms located in less densely populated 
provinces. Since environmental performances improved over time, the most likely 
explanation is that firms located in less populated provinces caught up in the longer 
term period.  
7.  Conclusions 
The reported success of public disclosure programs at inducing industrial pollution 
reductions has made this approach increasingly popular among policy makers around 
the world. Early experiences show that a small and properly managed infrastructure 
for collecting and disseminating information is sufficient for implementation. Our 
understanding of the different mechanisms through which provision of information 
works is however still limited. In this article we set out to unveil some of the 
characteristics of those firms that showed higher susceptibility to the provision of 
information in the context of Indonesia’s PROPER program, 1995–1998. The local 
Environmental Authority BAPEDAL sought to reduce industrial water emissions by a 
system of environmental rating. It had few instruments other than the mere public 
disclosure of the environmental ratings of firms. The program lasted for only a few 
years before the Asian crisis swept it away. However in that brief interlude it was 
rather successful and a number of countries set to emulate its design.  
Although the data set used in this study is one of the more comprehensive emission 
and rating data sets available in the developing world, it is still fairly limited in scope. 
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We are nevertheless able to identify a number of interesting findings: Firstly, foreign-
owned firms were consistently most responsive to the program, which can be 
interpreted as managers of polluting firms facing higher pressure from foreign 
investors. This is consistent with findings of the stock market literature that report that 
stock prices do react to bad environmental news. Note that foreign-owned firms are 
more sensitive to media and other attention. Also this types of firm could be more 
responsive since it may be expected to have lower emissions abatement costs.  
We also found that in the shorter term, firms located in the most densely populated 
areas responded better to the program. In particular being located in Java, Indonesia’s 
main island, seemed to be important in determining the extent to the response. Java is 
the most densely populated island on Earth, has higher incomes, better media 
coverage, access to political arena, and a greater potential for community pressure.  
Our results provide a general indication of the possible mechanisms at work in 
schemes such as PROPER. However, and as suggested earlier, in order to provide a 
more compelling picture of the role of different channels in disclosure programs, more 
detailed data is required. We have, for instance, argued that consumer and worker 
pressure seemed less likely in PROPER. Firms in PROPER were typically producers 
of intermediate goods far from the final consumer and, on the other hand, green 
consumerism does not appear to be well established in developing countries anyway. 
Also, workers in poor countries are not in the position to demand high work 
standards. Our data however did not allow us to test the importance of possible 
product and job markets interactions. Finally, it would be interesting to have more 
concrete information to analyze, for instance whether legal or informal actions 
undertaken by communities against polluters were intensified following information 
releases and, most importantly, whether these actions translated into emission 
reductions.  
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disclosure of the environmental performance of firms are the most important forces behind 
the implementation of both of these EMPs. Also, but to a lesser extent, export oriented firms 
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1.   Introduction  
This paper studies different characteristics of corporate environmental management and their 
determinants during the transition from Soviet style socialism towards market economics. 
Some proponents of this socialism asserted the belief that there would be less pollution in 
economies not driven by the profit motive, because planners would (or at least could) take 
into account all costs and benefits of pollution. However, in reality we generally observe the 
opposite: Under central planning, the bias towards heavy industry combined with a lack of 
incentives to implement practices that economize on inputs created considerable waste and 
pollution. We are particularly interested in the in the 1990 – 1998 period when the transition 
was taking its very first steps. We analyze data on 1,719 firms from the most polluting 
sectors in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. The data were 
collected in 1998 in a survey focusing mainly on environmental management. The survey 
shows that the environmental awareness of firms rose as market reforms were introduced. 
The number of firms that adopted Environmental Plans (EPs) and Environmental Department 
(EDs) during the first nine years of transition (1990 - 1998) increased by a factor of four and, 
two respectively. 
This study has two objectives. First, we seek to unveil the factors that spurred the adoption of 
Environmental Management Practices (EMPs) in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) during 
the transition. During this period the forces created by the example of Western economies 
had to struggle against the considerable inertia created by a managerial regime that lasted for 
as long as seventy years in Russia and over forty in Eastern Europe. During this period there 
was little room for change or even training in the necessary skills. We are interested in the 
strength of the transition forces to bring about social and managerial innovation in the use of 
natural resources. For instance, the desire to participate in foreign markets, especially at a 
time when industrial output was declining, could have been a strong motivating force in 
undertaking steps to harmonize with international norms. On more social grounds, increased 
civil liberties, such as wider information availability and higher public awareness about 
pollution and health risks, could also have been a determining factor. In fact, it is possible 
that the existence of civil liberties was one of the most crucial differences between “East” 
and “West.” Environmentalism did not develop automatically in the market economies 
either, but the existence of free press and civil liberties provided a mechanism to channel new 
information and new preferences, which led to environmental improvements. Finally, the 
3 
creation of environmental protection agencies that resembled the western regulator could 
have played an important role.1 
Our second aim is to add to the more general body of literature on environmental 
management by explicitly recognizing its multidimensional nature in a multivariate 
framework. Environmental management entails, by definition, a series of EMPs (Nash and 
Enrelfeld, 2001), and different combinations of EMPs might emerge in different 
organizations in response to particular needs and demands. Earlier papers that test the 
determinants of environmental management seem to overlook this aspect. Henriques and 
Sadorsky (1996) study the determinants of one EMP adoption, namely Environmental Plan 
(EP), in Canada. Dasgupta et al. (2000) analyzed data from the Mexican industry and look at 
the influences of different factors on separate EMPs and on an index defined by the number 
of EMPs adopted. A similar approach is used by Henriques and Sadorsky (2007) to analyze 
Hungarian firms. Khanna and Anton (2002) and Anton et al. (2004) also define a count of the 
number of EMPs to analyze U.S. firm data.2 Instead of collapsing environmental 
management into an index, we study the joint adoption decisions of two key EMPs, namely 
EP and Environmental Department (ED). We implement a bivariate probit that allows 
comparisons between the determinants of EP and ED adoption and some possible 
interrelations between these two decisions.  
The results show that those firms that faced higher enforcement and public disclosure of their 
environmental performances by the regulator were more likely to have adopted EPs and/ or 
EDs. Also, export oriented firms and larger firms as measured by number of employees, 
were more prone to adoption, but to a lower degree. The findings on enforcement and firm 
                                                 
1 The same data was used in Bluffstone and Sterner (2006), which contains further descriptive statistics of this 
data and background information. That study is more of a general description of environmental management 
concerns in Eastern Europe, but also includes a first exploratory analysis of the factors that determine the 
adoption of various kinds of EMPs. In this paper we overcome a number of methodological problems and probe 
deeper into the underlying determinants of EMPs. That initial analysis, for instance, does not use all information 
on enforcement actions to explain environmental behavior. Nor does it distinguish between those EMP that 
were adopted during central planning (before 1990) and transition (after 1990). The differences between this 
study and Bluffstone and Sterner (2006) are so numerous and far-reaching that the actual results cannot be 
directly compared. 
2 Dasgupta et al. (2000) and Khanna et al. (2004) also study the impact of environmental management on actual 
emissions. 
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size are consistent with studies carried out in countries with established market economies 
(Dasgupta et al., 2000; Khanna and Anton, 2002; Anton et al., 2004). Regarding export 
orientation, our findings are in line with Neumayer and Perkins (2004), a cross-country study 
that reports that exports of goods and services per capita are highly correlated with the 
country’s count of ISO14000 certifications, a well-known international voluntary standard 
for environmental management. In a related paper, Henriques and Sadorsky (2007) find 
similar results on product market pressure and firm size.3  To the best of our knowledge, no 
other studies has attempted to relate information disclosure on environmental events and 
firms’ environmental management. Our results on the significant role of disclosure are novel 
in this respect.4 This finding should be interpreted in terms of increased public awareness and 
public pressure that are not related to other variables we control for in the analysis. A factor 
that was expected to play a role but did not appear significant was private and foreign private 
ownership (as opposed to public ownership). 
The factors affecting EP and/or ED adoption appear to be the same: enforcement, public 
disclosure, exports, and firm size. This despite the fact that a fairly large proportion of EP 
adopters are not ED adopters in our sample, suggesting that some firms might see these as 
alternatives. The bivariate approach reveals that enforcement and public disclosure are more 
important in explaining the ED adoption decision, whereas export orientation and firm size 
perform better at explaining the EP adoption decision. Notably, once a firm has decided to 
adopt an ED, then additional increases in enforcement or disclosure do not seem to lead to 
EP implementation. 
We begin in Section 2 by discussing, as a background, the scope of environmental 
management in transition economies. In Section 3 we describe the data used in the analysis, 
while Section 4 introduces the methodological approach. Section 5 presents the results and 
Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion of the findings. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 That study uses Hungarian firm-level data from a more advanced stage of transition, namely year 2003, when 
Hungary signed the Treaty of Accession to the European Union. 
4 A number of papers have reported that releases of information about the environmental performance of firms 
do produce reductions in actual emissions (Konar and Cohen, 1997; Foulon et al., 2002; Garcia et al., 2004).  
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2.  Environmental management practices in transition 
During the socialist period, CEE countries were known for severe pollution (Satre-Ahlander, 
1994).  Coal was the primary source of energy ranging from 40% of the total energy use in 
Hungary to nearly 95% in Poland (Hughes, 1991; Chandler, 2000 p.139; Carter, 1993).  
Industry and power and heating plants tended to be located near coal reserves in order to 
reduce transport costs, and given the low quality of the coal, pollution was a severe threat to 
both people and ecosystems in these areas. Water quality was also a very serious problem: 
Over 80% of the East German rivers were considered highly polluted, and Czechoslovakia 
left almost half of its sewage untreated in 1980 (Environment for Europe, 1994).  In 
Lithuania, only the capital, Vilnius, had basic wastewater treatment. Poland’s Teja River 
contained 65 times more bacteria than recommended by the World Health Organization 
(Hughes, 1991; Wilczynski, 1990; Carter, 1993; Chandler, 2000).   
The CEE countries emitted much more pollution per unit of GDP and per person than the 
OECD countries.  For example, in 1980 the planned economies in Europe averaged 13 times 
more particulates per capita than the EU countries and three times more wastewater 
emissions.  SO2 emissions per capita were on average twice that of the EU countries (OECD, 
1999). Compared with Western Europe, the CEE countries produced 30% more SO2 per unit 
of energy consumed (Wilczynski, 1990; Sharma, 1997 p. 82). However, it should be 
acknowledged that there were some areas in which these economies did well from an 
environmental viewpoint. In the absence of many goods such as private cars, there well well-
developed systems of public transport, which have in some cases been reduced during the 
transition period. Similarly, there were recycling systems that have now been abandoned. 
Due to the nature of agriculture and transport, there were also some rural and wilderness 
areas that were less affected by pesticides and tourism than today.  
Separate environmental management systems in the sense that we are accustomed to, hardly 
existed in the planned economies of the time. Some, although very few, plants did of course 
have some form of waste treatment. However, the combination of a low overall interest in the 
environment and the fact that firms did not have the same need for signaling to customers 
and investors meant that there was little interest in creating special EMPs such as the ISO 
14000 certification.  
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In modern market economies on the other hand, the use of EMPs was already widespread in 
1990.  According to one survey from that time of 400 senior managers of international firms, 
almost 80% reported that they utilized such methods (McKinsey & Company, 1991). We 
also see a broad range of EMPs including the development of environmental plans, 
establishment of environmental departments, adoption of environmental audit programs and 
certificates such as ISO 14000, waste minimization and pollution prevention programs, and 
more frequent monitoring of air and water pollution emissions.  It is conceivable that these 
are mainly complements and that for instance the build-up of an environmental department 
leads to auditing and pollution prevention programs, which in turn necessitate a further 
strengthening of the environmental departments. It is however also conceivable that they 
partly are substitutes, in particular if a firm views this as an “image issue”. If they then 
manage to get a certification, they may feel they do not have to make any more 
improvements since they already acquired sufficiently green credentials for marketing or 
other purposes. 
This latter possibility is however limited by the fact that many of these programs have their 
own logic. They lead to people being hired, trained, and focused on environmental issues and 
their interests have a tendency to become a force in its own right. Some programs are also 
quite formal and abide by rules set by outside organizations.  This applies for instance to the 
set of measures necessary for International Standards Organization 14000 series certification.  
An ISO 14001 certification requires documentation of environmental planning, monitoring 
and assessment.  In addition to being a potentially useful tool for management, it is assumed 
to signal commitment and quality, which may explain its value to the firm (Boiral and Sala, 
1998; Clapp, 2001). It has been found that EU importers put great weight on the ISO 14001 
certification when choosing trade partners, (see Bellesi et al, 2005).   King and Lenox (2001) 
suggest that cost savings may be a separate factor since at least US firms with an ISO 140001 
certification tend to also have an ISO 9001 certification, which deals with product quality.   
There is a group of articles that study the determinants of EMPs. This includes Henriques and 
Sadorsky (1996) who study the existence of environmental plans in Canadian firms, and the 
role of ownership structure and the existence of outside pressure from consumers, investors, 
community, and government.  Another study showing the importance of good relations with 
stakeholders, especially regulators and consumers is Benito and Benito (2005), who find that 
the main mechanism is more effective regulatory compliance and cost savings. Khanna and 
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Anton (2002) show that important factors are the threat of tougher regulation and the fear of 
liabilities. They also note that EMPs are not necessarily alternatives to regulation, since they 
are usually undertaken against a backdrop of solid regulatory regimes which create the 
necessary incentives. Anton et al. (2004) find that not only consumers, but also concern for 
the opinion of investors and even competitors, may prompt environmental action. 
The studies just mentioned all look at market economies. Data on economies in transition 
offer us the opportunity to look at other, more fundamental, factors of firm behavior. During 
the transition some dramatic changes occur in the parameters that we believe are fundamental 
but, that are usually constant in modern economies. Examples include the creation of secure 
property, functioning markets, and competition, all of which may be expected to strongly 
enhance the incentives for efficient production. Brown et al. (2006) find, for example, that 
privatization is associated with 15 to 50% increases in productivity in Romanian 
manufacturing, and 8% to 28% in Hungary. Collins and Harris (2002) analyze a sample of 
UK metal manufacturing plants and find that foreign-owned plants are more likely to invest 
in pollution abatement and invest more than purely domestic plants. Sterner (1990) finds that 
while cooperative ownership is superior, foreign multinational ownership could be either 
more or in fact less energy efficient than local ownership in Mexican cement manufacturing. 
Dasgupta et al. (2000) analyze Mexican firms as well, and report that formal regulation and 
public trading of a firm’s stock are associated with EMPs.  
One of the most striking features of the transition was the internationalization of the 
economies that had previously been fairly isolated.5 Foreign direct investment is likely to 
have important environmental implications.  In a survey of 1,000 potential foreign corporate 
investors, over three-quarters said they utilized corporate or headquarter country 
environmental management standards when they were stricter than those in their countries of 
investment (see Klavens and Zamparutti,1995; Environment for Europe, 1994).   
Similarly, increased exports to market economies could also spur adoption of EMPs.  Quality 
standards are often higher in western markets and can typically only be met by using 
improved technologies mediated by EMPs (Andonova, 2003).   Consumers in many of these 
                                                 
5 CEE countries experienced significant foreign direct investment (estimated at $70 billion) flowing into the 
region in the 1990s.  Export earnings averaged almost 9% during 1993-98, with the share of exports to the West 
increasing to 67% by 1999 (World Bank, 2000).  
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countries often prefer products manufactured using environmentally benign methods, but 
have little direct information on these processes.  Firms with higher foreign trade shares may 
therefore adopt EMPs to signal green production methods (Bellesi et al., 2005). Requiring 
some proof of environmental management may finally also be very popular since it provides 
a convenient non-tariff trade barrier that can help protect domestic firms against cheap 
imports. 
Finally, freedom of speech, press and association may have fundamental effects on the 
adoption of EMPs. We know that environmental management in industrialized countries is a 
result of a struggle, and, that the effects of open media and civil liberties such as the right to 
organize action groups were very important. The literature on voluntary environmental 
agreements and environmental information shows that making information available can 
have significant effects on firm behavior.    
While little information on pollution was available before 1989, today such information is 
generally public since most of these countries enforce the public's right to know about the 
environment.   Under socialism there were very few independent environmental advocacy 
groups, but by 1997 the Regional Environment Center headquartered in Budapest had 
identified 3,000 such NGOs working for improved environmental quality in the region. 
Furthermore, the official inspection, monitoring, and regulatory authorities (such as 
Ministries of Environment), environmental protection agencies, and inspectorates were 
strengthened during this period.  Monitoring systems were put in place and though by no 
means perfect, the produced data are increasingly used for enforcement purposes.  
3.  Data  
We analyze data from firms located in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia.6  These countries represent a wide variety of cultures and transition experiences, 
with Hungary and Poland considered the most advanced in terms of private sector 
development, followed by Lithuania and Slovakia and then Romania and Bulgaria.  The data 
were gathered in 1998 by professional research firms or institutes that either had substantial 
experience in environmental economics research or specialized in survey implementation.  
                                                 
6 The data were collected within a project run by the Harvard Institute for International Development and are 
described in somewhat greater detail in Bluffstone and Sterner (2006). 
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The sample was stratified to include only firms operating in industries that are generally 
highly polluting and therefore likely to face environmental management challenges. The 
present study covers animal raising, mining, electric power and manufacturing.   
Our focus is on the establishment of Environmental Plans (EPs) and Environmental 
Departments (EDs) during the first years of transition; thus, we take EP and ED adoption as 
dependent variables in the analysis. The survey asked firms whether they had an EP or an ED 
in 1998 and the year(s) of initiation. Table 1 shows that the rate of adoption of EMPs during 
1990 - 1998 was large; the number of firms that adopted EPs and EDs increased by a factor 
of four and two respectively. Before 1990, relatively few firms had EPs and around 42% of 
the firms adopted either EPs or EDs in the 1990 -1998 period.7  
Table 1.  Environmental Plan (EP) and Environmental Department (ED) 
Period EP adoption ED adoption 
Before 1990 159      (9%) 272     (16%) 
During 1990 – 98 583     (34%) 554     (32%) 
Never 977     (57%) 893     (52%) 
Total 1,719     (100%) 1,719     (100%) 
 
Table 2 presents the joint EP and ED adoption frequencies for both the full sample and a 
restricted sample that excludes the firms that had adopted either an ED or an EP before 1990. 
The first panel (all firms) gives a general picture of the adoption levels for 1998: almost 40% 
of the firms did not have an ED or an EP, about one third of the firms had either an ED or an 
EP, and around 30% hd both. Roughly 60% of the firms that had an ED also had an EP, but 
the fact that one third only had one of them suggest that some firms might see them as 
alternatives. We will therefore look more closely at how these decisions are interrelated. The 
proportion of early adopters is relatively small and patterns similar to those of the 
unrestricted sample are observed. 19.9% of the 1,719 firms in the original sample had 
implemented either an EP or an ED prior to  1990. 
                                                 
7 The survey also asked about the possible presence of other EMPs in 1998, such as the existence of a 
functioning water treatment plant or the presence of internal monitoring. No information on the year of 
initiation was however requested, thus it is not possible to attribute their implementation to social planning 
forces (before 1990) or to the transition forces (after 1990).  
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Table 2.  Cross tabulation EP and ED adoption observed in 1998 
All firms (N = 1719) 
 Without firms that had adopted either ED 
or EP before 1990 (N = 1376) 
 ED = 0 ED = 1 Total 
 
 ED = 0 ED = 1 Total 
EP = 0 
658    
(38%) 
319    
(19%) 
977    
(57%) 
 
EP = 0 
658    
(48%) 
235    
(17%) 
893    
(65%) 
EP = 1 
235    
(14%) 
507    
(29%) 
742    
(43%) 
 
EP = 1 
199   
(14%) 
284    
(21%) 
483    
(35%) 
Total 
893    
(52%) 
826    
(48%) 
1719    
(100%) 
 
Total 
857   
(62%) 
519   
(38%) 
1376    
(100%)  
 
We are mainly interested in explaining the determinants of ED and EP implementation 
during the first years of transition, or the 1990 – 1998 period. In fact, the information on the 
explanatory variables used in the econometric analysis is defined for this period. Note that 
once adoption occurs in a given period, we do not observe further changes in environmental 
behavior in later periods for these firms. In light of these constraints, the sample considered 
in the econometric analysis (N=1,376) consists of the firms that had adopted neither an EP 
nor an ED before 1990.  
Table 3 presents a description of the explanatory variables, their role in the analysis, and 
some basic statistics. The upper panel presents a set of country control variables. The 
existence of EDs varied widely across countries with less than a 15% prevalence among 
Hungarian, Lithuanian and Polish firms while the adoption rater was 45% and 78% in 
Bulgaria and Romania. Thus, a need to control for possible country-specific effects seems 
apparent. On the other hand, about one-third to one-half of the firms reported having 
environmental plans. The lower panel of Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for additional 
explanatory variables. The variable AGE refers to the age of most firm equipment. Our 
presumption is that firms with older capital infrastructure had organizations that were more 
rooted in the communist times, and would oppose the implementation of new managerial 
strategies. Notably, the equipment of “the average firm” was built as far back as 1972. The 
variable EMPLOYMENT is used as a measure of firm size. Since the costs of coordination in 
large organizations are expected to be high, a plan of action, such as an EP, and a 
coordinating body, such as an ED, could reduce such costs. Also, large firms can exploit 
economies of scale in the development of EMPs.  
The last set of variables captures external pressure sources, which were widely discussed in 
the Section 2. The ownership structure of the firm is included as a proxy for investor pressure 
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and is captured by two variables: the proportion of private ownership (PRIVATE OWNER) 
and a dummy (FOREIGN OWNER) for firms that were foreign-owned.  Two-thirds of the 
total capital stock was owned by private shareholders and around 15% of the firms were, 
partially or totally, owned by foreign investors. The dummy variable DISCLOSURE is an 
indicator of public awareness and public pressure, taking the value of one if the regulator 
informed the public about the firms’ emissions of major pollutants. About a quarter of our 
sample of firms were subject to public scrutiny. Finally, three dummy variables, namely 
WARNINGS, ORDERS, and FINES, capture regulatory pressure. Although the proportion of 
firms that were subject to each type of enforcement action appears fairly similar, it was not 
the same firms that were subject to such actions; the correlations among the three 
enforcement dummies is relatively low (0.29 between WARNINGS and ORDERS, 0.23 
between WARNINGS and FINES, and 0.21 between ORDERS and FINES).  
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Table 3.  Independent Variables: Definition and descriptive statistics 
N = 1376 
   Variable Description A proxy for Mean                           SD 
 
BULGARIA 
HUNGARY 
LITHUANIA 
POLAND 
ROMANIA 
SLOVAKIA 
 
1 if located in Bulgaria 
1 if located in Hungary 
1 if located in Lithuania 
1 if located in Poland 
1 if located in Romania 
1 if located in Slovakia 
 
Country control  
Country control 
Country control 
Country control 
Country control 
Country control 
     
 0.1810                      0.3852 
 0.1934                      0.3951 
 0.1374                      0.3444 
 0.1745                      0.3797 
 0.3090                      0.4622 
 0.0043                      0.0659 
AGE  
EMPLOYEES 
PRIVATE 
FOREIGN OWNER 
EXPORT SHARE  
DISCLOSURE 
WARNINGS 
ORDERS 
FINES 
 
Age of most firm equipment  
Number of employees (log) 
Proportion of private (national & foreign) ownership 
1 if firm had foreign ownership 
Proportion exports of total production 
Public was informed about firms pollution. 
1 if firm received any warnings  
1 if firm received any order to reduce pollution  
1 if firm was  fined 
Control  
Control (Firm size) 
Shareholders pressure 
Shareholders pressure (FDI) 
Product market pressure 
Public awareness and public pressure 
Government regulatory pressure 
Government regulatory pressure 
Government regulatory pressure 
26.1265                   19.2722 
5.4514                      1.4083 
66.4883                   39.7687 
 0.1418                      0.3489 
24.4574                    35.1378 
 0.2290                       0.4204 
 0.1672                       0.3733 
 0.1061                       0.3081 
 0.1410                       0.3482  
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4.  Empirical approach  
Our empirical approach is based on a latent regression. Firm i’s net benefits of adopting a 
given environmental management practice j can be represented as: 
*
ij j i ijxpi β ε′= + , 
where xi are observable firm characteristics and other factors that determine the profitability, 
*
ijpi , of the adoption decision, and ijε  is an unobserved random component. In practice, 
*
ijpi  is 
unobservable. What we observe is a dummy variable defined by: 
01
00
ij
ij
ij
y if
pi
pi
∗
∗
>
=  ≤
 .
 
 
It is thus assumed that adoption occurs if it is profitable to the firm. We intend to explain the 
establishment of not only one but two EMPs. Note that Table 2 represents a joint distribution 
between the variables ED and EP and that a positive correlation between the two is apparent. 
In principle it is natural to think that at least some of the (observed and unobserved) 
determinants of different EMPs are similar. We thus implement a bivariate probit model 
where the two decisions are jointly estimated and are allowed to be correlated (Green, 2003). 
The model is characterized by:  
1
2
1 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
iEP
iEP i iEP i
iEP
iED
iED i iED i
iED
x EP if
x ED if
pi
pi β ε
pi
pi
pi β ε
pi
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
>
′= + =
≤
>
′= + =
≤
,   (1) 
where ( ),iEP iEDε ε
( ),iEP iEDε ε
is distributed as a bivariate normal with zero means, unit variances and 
correlation ρ between its two components. Since we do not have strong a priori hypotheses 
on different determinants of ED and EP adoption, the vector of explanatory variables xi  is the 
same in both equations. There are four types of observations in our sample, 
( , ) (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), (1,1)EP ED → . Using the bivariate normal distribution, probabilities for 
each one of these events are constructed and incorporated in a log-likelihood function for 
estimation. Recall that marginal, joint and conditional probabilities can be defined within a 
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multivariate framework. In our bivariate case the associated marginal probability for ED 
adoption is:  
[ ] 1 1Pr 1 ( )i iED xβ= = Φ ,    (2) 
where 1( )Φ ⋅  is the cumulative univariate normal distribution function. The joint probabilities 
associated with ED adoption are: 
[ ]
[ ]
2 1 2
2 1 2
Pr 1 , 1 ( , , )
Pr 1 , 0 ( , , )
i i i i
i i i i
ED EP x x
ED EP x x
β β ρ
β β ρ
= = = Φ
= = = Φ − −
,   (3a, 3b) 
where 2 ( )Φ ⋅  is the cumulative bivariate normal distribution function. Marginal and joint 
probabilities can be used to calculate the following conditional probabilities: 
[ ]
[ ]
2 1 2 1 1 2
2 1/ 2
1 2
2 1 2 1 1 2
2 1/ 2
1 2
( , , ) ( )
Pr 1  | 1
( ) (1 )
( , , ) ( )
Pr 1  | 0
( ) (1 )
i i i i
i i
i
i i i i
i i
i
x x x x
ED EP
x
x x x x
ED EP
x
β β ρ β ρβ
β ρ
β β ρ β ρβ
β ρ
Φ Φ −
= = = =
Φ −
Φ − − Φ − +
= = = =
Φ − −
 , (4a,4b) 
Equations (2), (3a, 3b) and (4a, 4b) can also be defined for EP; in fact, they will have similar 
forms. Note that when the correlation coefficient is zero, then conditional probabilities 
degenerate into marginal probabilities and joint probabilities become equal to the product of 
marginal probabilities. 
The model described above resembles a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) where the 
dependent variables are dummy variables. SUR models are usually justified by higher 
efficiency relative to single equation techniques, where the possible correlation across error 
terms is not exploited in estimation. It has however been established that gains in efficiency 
are reduced when the sets of independent variables across equations are the same, as they are 
in our case (Wooldrige, 2001). Note though that in the application presented in this paper we 
are particularly interested in the estimation of the correlation coefficient itself, since it 
provides evidence on possible similarities (or dissimilarities) of ED and EP determinants that 
are not observable to us. Also marginal, joint and conditional probabilities of the estimated 
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bivariate distribution give further insights on firm motives to adopt ED and/or EP and, most 
importantly, the level of interdependence.  
5.  Results 
Table 4 presents marginal effects for marginal and joint probabilities based on a full 
information maximum likelihood estimates of the bivariate probit model for ED and EP 
adoption. For the continuous variables, the estimates measure a partial increase in the 
probability of observing a given event due to a partial change in the independent variables. 
For dummy variables, the marginal effects are calculated as differences in the probabilities of 
observing adoption for the two possible values of the variables. All marginal effects are 
calculated at sample means. The cross tabulation in the bottom right panel of the table relates 
predicted outcomes to actual events using a threshold probability value of 0.5. The estimated 
model correctly predicts 84% of the outcomes. Also, the correlation between the two random 
terms is positive, large and highly significant implying that some of the unobserved 
determinants of ED and EP adoption could be the same and that there is a complementarity in 
both of these EMPs. 
Marginal Probabilities of EP and ED adoption 
The first two columns of Table 4 present marginal effects for marginal probabilities where 
the decisions to adopt an ED and an EP are considered separately (see equation 2). These 
marginal effects inherit the signs and the significance levels from the regression estimates, 
which have been omitted for the sake of brevity. Apart from some country controls, similar 
sets of variables appear consistently significant and with the same signs in both sets of 
parameter estimates. Although the warnings and fines dummy variables are both significant 
in the ED equation, neither appears significant in the EP equation. The third measure of 
government enforcement, the orders dummy variable, is significant in both models. The fact 
that not only the observed but also the unobserved factors that determine EP and ED 
adoption are alike is an interesting finding. Recall that not all EP adopters are ED adopters, 
and vice versa. Apparently, firms with similar characteristics that are faced with similar 
external pressure undertake either or both strategies. Firms with larger numbers of 
employees, that are more export-oriented, and that are faced with public disclosure and 
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higher enforcement, are more likely to adopt EMPs. Age and ownership variables appear 
non-significant in the regression results and throughout the analysis.  
 
Table 4: Marginal effects on Marginal and Joint Probabilities 
VARIABLE 
∆ Prob [ED=1] 
∆ x 
∆ Prob [EP=1] 
∆ x 
∆ Prob [ED=1, EP=1] 
∆ x 
 
BULGARIA d 
 
HUNGARY d 
 
LITHUANIA d 
 
POLANDd 
 
SLOVAKIAd 
 
AGE  
 
EMPLOYEES (log) 
 
PRIVATE 
 
FOREIGN OWNERd 
 
EXPORTSHARE 
 
DISCLOSUREd 
 
WARNINGSd  
 
ORDERSd 
 
FINESd 
 
 
-0.2558 *** 
 ( 0.0351) 
-.40921 *** 
 (0.0323) 
-0.4040 ***    
(0.0262) 
-0.3887 ***     
(0.0263) 
-0.3039 ***     
(0.0340)  
0.0007    
(0.0010)  
0.0268 *   
(0.0137) 
0.0003   
(0.0005)  
-0.0310       
(0.0466) 
0.0013 **     
(0.0006) 
0.1052 ***     
(0.0407) 
0.1781 ***      
(0.0587) 
0.1279 **     
(0.0631) 
0.0843 *     
(0.0481) 
 
-0.1812 ***  
(0.0393) 
0.0670  
(0.0688)  
-0.1259 ***    
(0.0439) 
0.0428    
(0.0501) 
0.1724     
(0.2474) 
-0.0006   
(0.0008) 
0.0341 ***  
(0.0119) 
-0.0003    
(0.0004) 
-0.0111    
(0.0416) 
0.0022 ***      
(0.0005) 
0.0739 **     
(0.0364) 
0.0103      
(0.0432) 
0.1100 **    
(0.0502 ) 
0.0450     
(0.0438) 
 
-0.1604 ***    
(0.0193) 
-0.1911 ***    
(0.0209) 
-0.2160 ***    
(0.0157) 
-0.1865 ***    
(0.0167)  
-0.1641 ***    
(0.0291) 
-0.0005   
(0.0006) 
0.0243 ***   
(0.0084) 
0.0000   
(0.0003) 
-0.0000   
(0.0284) 
0.0010 ***  
(0.0002) 
0.0745  *** 
(0.0274)  
0.0735 ***  
 (0.0334) 
0.0914***   
(0.0350) 
0.0509 *   
(0.0290) 
N                                1375 
Rho                           0.5280 ***  
                   (0.0444) 
Log likelihood        -1347.71 
Pseudo R2                  0.22 
 
Cross tabulation of EP and ED. 
 Fitted values in brackets  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ED= 0 ED=1 
658 199 EP= 0 
[ 894 ] [ 48 ] 
235 284 EP=1 
[ 178 ] [ 256] 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at a 10% level; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Marginal effects for dummy variables are measured at the means of other variables whereas marginal effects for 
continuous variables are given at the means of all variables. 
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Regarding the size of the marginal effects for marginal probabilities (first two columns in 
Table 4), enforcement and disclosure have a stronger effect on ED adoption, while 
employment and exports have a stronger effect on EP adoption. The sum of the three 
marginal effects for warnings, orders and fines is 0.39 for ED adoption and only 0.16 for EP 
adoption. The existence of warnings increases the probability of ED adoption by 17.9%, 
whereas the presence of fines increases the likelihood of having such institutions by 8.4%. 
No significant effects of the fines and warnings dummy variables are found on EP adoption. 
The marginal effects associated with orders to reduce emission dummies are similar in both 
models at around 12%. Those firms whose environmental performances are publicly 
disclosed increase the probability of ED (EP) adoption by 10.5% (7.4%). An increase in the 
proportion of exported products increases the probability of ED (EP) adoption by only 0.1% 
(0.2%). A percentage increase in the number of employees is reflected in a 2.7% and a 3.4% 
increase in the probability of ED adoption and EP adoption, respectively. 
The third column of Table 4 shows the marginal effects on the (joint) probability of firms 
implementing both an ED and an EP. The determinants of environmental management reveal 
themselves with high accuracy in this set of results compared to those of marginal 
probabilities shown in the first two columns. All determining variables except fines are 
significant at a 1% level when we analyze the firms that have both EP and ED.  
Conditional Probabilities of EP and ED adoption 
Table 5 presents the marginal effects on conditional probabilities. The first panel shows that, 
given a constant EP adoption status, employment and export shares do not increase the 
probability of ED adoption whereas disclosure and warnings do have a positive significant 
effect. Note also that other enforcement variables - the orders and fines dummies - are 
positive and have relatively small standard errors, although not small enough to make them 
significant at a 10% level. If a given firm is faced with, lets say, some enforcement action, 
and it already has an EP (or does not have an EP and decides not to adopt one), then the 
likelihood of ED is not increased. On the other hand, the second panel reveals that, “other 
things being equal,” employment and export shares do increase the probability of EP 
adoption whereas disclosure and enforcement actions have no effect.  
18 
Table 5: Marginal Effects on Conditional Probabilities 
VARIABLE 
∆Prob[ED=1 | EP=1] 
∆x 
∆Prob[ED=1 | EP=0] 
∆x 
∆Prob[EP=1 | ED=1] 
∆x 
∆Prob[EP=1 | ED=0] 
∆x 
 
BULGARIA d 
 
HUNGARY d 
 
LITHUANIA d 
 
POLANDd 
 
SLOVAKIAd 
 
AGE  
 
EMPLOYEES (log) 
 
PRIVATE 
 
FOREIGN OWNERd 
 
EXPORTSHARE 
 
DISCLOSUREd 
 
WARNINGSd  
 
ORDERSd 
 
FINESd 
 
-0.2772 ***     
(0.0593) 
-0.6159 ***      
(0.0473) 
-0.5990 ***      
(0.0367) 
-0.5872 ***      
(0.0376) 
-0.5154 ***      
(0.0603) 
-0.0006   
(0.0012) 
 0.0171   
(0.0163) 
 0.0005   
(0.0005) 
-0.0444   
(0.0574) 
0.0006   
(0.0007) 
0.0915 **      
(0.0437) 
 0.1959 ***     
 (0.0531) 
 0.0998       
(0.0638) 
0.0793   
(0.0511) 
 
-0.1728 ***    
(0.0305) 
-0.319 ***     
 (0.0291) 
-0.2894 ***    
 (0.0269) 
-0.2982 ***     
(0.0257) 
-0.2082 ***      
(0.0208) 
-0.0005    
(0.0008) 
 0.0143    
(0.0116) 
 0.0004    
(0.0004) 
-0.0298      
(0.0381) 
 0.0005      
(0.0004) 
0.07356 **     
(0.0357)  
 0.1637 ***     
(0.0541) 
 0.08407     
 (0.0561)  
 0.0632     
 (0.0419) 
 
-0.0914      
(0.0635) 
  0.3469 ***      
(0.0619) 
 0.1944 ***     
 (0.0626)  
 0.3143 ***     
 (0.0479) 
 0.3684 ***     
(0.1004) 
-0.0004   
(0.0011)  
 0.0287 **   
(0.0139 ) 
-0.0006   
(0.0005) 
0.0286   
(0.0486) 
0.0021 ***  
(0.0006) 
0.0394      
(0.0396)  
-0.0655      
(0.0470) 
 0.0702      
(0.0520) 
 0.0152      
(0.0480) 
 
-0.0928 ***     
(0.0356) 
 0.1925 ***    
(0.0677) 
 0.0062      
(0.0433) 
 0.1633 ***     
(0.0497) 
 0.2753    
(0.2494) 
-0.0003   
(0.0008) 
 0.0230  ** 
(0.0101) 
 -0.0004   
(0.0004) 
0.0188      
(0.0365) 
0.0017 *** 
(0.0005) 
0.0363      
(0.0308) 
-0.0401      
(0.0322) 
0.0626      
(0.0446) 
0.0163      
(0.0368) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at a 10% level; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Marginal effects for dummy variables are measured at the means of other variables whereas marginal effects for 
continuous variables are given at the means of all variables. 
 
The results on marginal probabilities show that enforcement, disclosure, export, and 
employment seem to explain both EDs and EPs. The results on conditional probabilities 
provide an indication of the relative importance of these four factors at explaining each of 
these EMPs.  
We have put quite some effort into making sure that the covariates used in the analysis are 
exogeneous. For instance, although available to us, we did not use data on manager 
perceptions of the factors that could possibly induce EMP adoption. Neither did we use 
information on early adopters (those firms that implemented EMPs before 1990) since our 
covariates are defined for the 1990 - 1998 period. The types of variables that we did use are 
however interlinked in complex ways and we do acknowledge that our estimates could still 
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be biased due to some endogeneity. For instance, facilities that faced higher enforcement and 
whose pollution levels were publicly disclosed in the news were more likely to have EDs 
and/or EPs. However, the firms that had adopted EMPs might subsequently have faced less 
pressure from authorities and would thus have been less likely to appear in the news as heavy 
polluters since EMPs could signal compliance. This line of reasoning would actually still 
strengthen our general conclusions since it indicates that our results underestimate the effects 
of enforcement and disclosure.8  
6.  Conclusions 
The findings in this paper suggest that the fall in industrial output during the early 1990s in 
CEE might not have been the only factor leading to the observed improvements in ambient 
quality, as has often been noted.9 In fact, 42% of the firms in our sample adopted EPs and/or 
EDs during the 1990 -1998 period. We know that changes in production processes and the 
implementation of abatement technologies, which are arguably results of managerial 
strategies, could also lead to emissions reductions.10 In this paper, we delved into the 
determinants of both these EMPs. 
Our results show that the observed determinants of EP and ED adoption are practically the 
same and that the unobserved determinants of these two EMPs are highly correlated. These 
                                                 
8 There is another possibility: if the firms that adopted EMPs were rewarded in foreign markets our export 
variable might suffer some upward bias. Note however that we recognize in our discussion that this variable, 
although significant, seems to have a small effect on EMP implementation.  
9 The economic transitions in CEE countries greatly reduced stationary source air and water pollution. For 
example, in the Slovak Republic emissions of particulate matter (an important air pollutant) by stationary 
sources declined by 80% during the eight years between 1990 and 1997.  SO2 emissions fell by over 60% and 
NOx declined by 45% during the same period (Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic, 1998). In 
Lithuania, for example, industrial emissions of chrome and copper declined by 65% - 70% during 1989 - 1994 
alone.  Biological oxygen demand in surface waters fell by about 90% during the 1990s (Ministry of 
Environment of Lithuania, 2001).   
10 A number of studies have shown that firms with EMPs produce less pollution and are more likely to comply 
with environmental legislation. Anton, Deltas, and Khanna (2004) found that firms with more comprehensive 
environmental management systems had lower toxic releases per unit of sales.  Newbold (2006) found that 
adoption of EMPs in the Chilean mining sector improves the environmental performance of firms.  Nash and 
Ehrenfeld (2001) note several examples where adoption of EMPs likely improved environmental performance 
in US firms. They also note that when EMPs conflict with other goals, firms may drop or revise them.   
20 
findings, although not necessarily surprising, are not directly evident from the data where a 
fairly good proportion of EP adopters are not ED adopters and vice versa. The factors that 
appear to have driven both EP and ED adoption are: (a) enforcement activities, which 
seemed to increase during the transition thanks to the creation of environmental management 
agencies; (b) public disclosure of environmental performance indicators of firms; c) export-
orientation of a firm; and finally, (d) firm size. Factors that were expected to play a role but 
did not appear significant in the analysis were: private and foreign private ownership (as 
opposed to public ownership) and plant age.  
We also find that enforcement and disclosure are more important for explaining the build up 
of environmental bureaucracies (ED) whereas employment and export orientation are more 
important at explaining the adoption of plans (EP). One possible interpretation might  be that 
the former is the more “Soviet” or, in this context, “old-fashioned” response which is mainly 
triggered by variables such as regulatory policies and disclosure while the adoption of 
environmental plans is a more “modern” or market based response and thus more sensitive to 
variables such as export orientation 
We find a correlation between the EP and ED decisions, which may suggest some 
unobserved variables determining them both, which in turn shows that these decisions need 
to be modeled and analyzed with discretion. From a policy viewpoint, perhaps the most 
important new knowledge to emerge is that enforcement is a strong and positive determinant 
of both EPs and EDs. The implication of this is that market reform and deregulation are not 
necessarily going to lead to an automatic enthusiasm for environmental management; there is 
still an important role for the regulator. 
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